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Abstract 
Costly Arbitrage and the Lead-Lag Structure between Value and Glamour Stocks
M otivated by the findings o f  Lo and M ackinlay (1990) that size premium can be partially 
attributed to the lead-lag relation between the returns o f  large stocks and those o f  small stocks, in 
this thesis we hypothesize that a possible lead-lag structure between value and glamour returns 
can partially explain the value premium anomaly.
The thesis consists o f three chapters. Chapter I documents a pronounced lead-lag structure 
between value and glam our stocks: the glam our stocks lead value stocks in terms o f both mean 
returns and residual volatilities, suggesting that value stocks delay in price adjustment to new 
information. To further explore the issue, we test the lead-lag price reaction to market- and firm- 
specific information separately in Chapters II and III. The results show that value stocks lag in 
absorbing both market- and firm -specific information relative to glamour stocks.
Consistent w ith the costly arbitrage literature, w hich posits that arbitrage cost is the major 
deterrent to market efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Pontiff 1996, 2005, and Mendenhall 
2004), our results show that value stocks are exposed to higher arbitrage cost than glamour stocks. 
Specifically, we find that value stocks are associated w ith high idiosyncratic risk that impedes the 
prompt price reaction to new information. That is, value stocks are exposed to higher 
unhedgeable fundamental risk that forces arbitrageurs to refrain form establishing positions in 
value stocks. This pattern does not gain support in glamour stocks. In addition, the thesis provides 
evidence that arbitrage risk is priced into value stock returns, suggesting that stocks subject to 
high arbitrage risk commands a return premium. Accordingly, value premium can be viewed, to 
certain extent, as com pensation for bearing higher arbitrage risk, rather than systematic risk.
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Introduction
Lo and M acKinlay (1990) docum ent an asymmetric information diffusion between stock 
returns: The returns o f  large-capitalization stocks almost always lead those o f  smaller stocks. 
They also demonstrate that this lead-lag relation can partially explain the observed contrarian 
profits. For example, i f  price changes o f  stock A lead those o f  stock B, a contrarian strategy may 
profit from buying stock B subsequent to an increase in stock A and selling stock B subsequent to 
a decline in stock A. A lthough there is a certain agreement that lead-lag structure can lead to 
contrarian profits (Boudoukh, Richardson, and W hitelaw 1994, Jegadeesh and Titman 1995), the 
lead-lag hypothesis has never been proposed to explain the value premium, the most obvious 
implication o f  the contrarian model.
The first goal o f  the thesis is to investigate this potential explanation for the value premium: 
the lead-lag relationship between returns o f  glamour and value stocks. Chapter I o f  the thesis 
documents pronounced asymmetric inform ation diffusion between glamour and value stocks: the 
glamour stocks lead value stocks in term s o f  both returns and volatility, suggesting that glamour 
stocks react to information faster than value stocks do. Accordingly, the higher returns o f  glamour 
stock in portfolio form ation period imply higher returns for value stock in the next period. In fact, 
if  the magnitude o f  price increases for value stocks after portfolio formation is large enough, the 
book to market ratio o f  the value stocks w ill fall to the extent that they become glamour stocks in 
the next period. The value strategy can thus profit from buying value stocks subsequent the 
superior performance o f glamour stocks. Therefore, the asymmetric price response to new 
information between value and glam our stocks, and the delayed price reaction on part o f the value 
stocks in particular, can partially explains the observed value premium. This interpretation o f the 
value profit is consistent w ith the findings o f  Hou and M oskowitz (2005) that firms with delayed 
price adjustm ent earn higher returns.
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2Then the natural question that rises is why value stocks lag behind glamour stocks in reacting 
to new information. Strict market efficiency requires that securities prices immediately reflect all 
available inform ation and the arbitrage mechanism is the vehicle that eliminates m ispricing and 
delivers efficiency. However, costly and risky arbitrage deters risk averse arbitrageurs from 
taking enough position to eliminate m ispricing and restore market efficiency. Thus it takes longer 
for the stocks w ith high arbitrage cost to converge to fundamental value and fully reflect new 
information. Prior empirical studies investigating the effect o f  costly arbitrage on the existence o f 
mispricing and delayed price adjustm ent to new information focus mainly on the “cost” part o f 
the arbitrage activities (e.g. Garman and O hlson 1981, Knez and Ready 1996, and Barber et al. 
2001), not much on the “risk” part o f  the arbitrage activities. However, recent literature o f costly 
arbitrage posits that arbitrage risk, or idiosyncratic risk is the largest impediment to market 
efficiency because arbitrageurs are unable to hedge idiosyncratic risk and thus they care more 
about idiosyncratic risk than systematic risk when they take trading positions. (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, and Pontiff 1996, 2005). Empirical studies also provide evidence in support o f  the 
argument that idiosyncratic risk is the largest barrier to arbitrage. For example, Ali, et al (2003) 
find that value effect is greater for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, consistent w ith the 
argument that idiosyncratic risk exacerbates m arket inefficiency. M endenhall (2004) provides 
empirical evidence that post earnings announcem ent drift increases with idiosyncratic risk, 
sugesting that idiosyncratic risk ham pers the immediate price adjustment to new information.
The second goal o f  the thesis is to investigate w hether the arbitrage cost, and in particular, 
idiosyncratic risk explains the slower reaction to new information on the part o f  value stocks. 
Chapter II o f  the thesis focuses on the asymmetric price reaction to market information between 
value and glamour stocks, and how the arbitrage cost might be relevant in explaining the 
phenomenon. Chapter III o f  the thesis focuses on the asymmetric price reaction to firm specific 
information (earnings announcements) between value and glamour stocks, and how the arbitrage 
cost relevant in explaining the post earnings announcem ent price drift.
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3The study contributes to the finance literature in three ways. 1) This is the first study that 
identifies the lead-lag relationship between returns o f  value stocks and those o f glamour stocks, 
w hich provides a potential explanation for the value premium. 2) The thesis bridges the literature 
o f  asymmetric information assim ilation and the literature o f costly arbitrage by providing 
empirical evidence that arbitrage cost plays an important role in explaining the lead-lag 
relationship between value and glamour stocks. The results provide support to the argument that 
arbitrage cost, and idiosyncratic risk in particular, is a m ajor impediment to market efficiency 
from the perspective that high arbitrage cost stocks (value stocks) lag in reacting to new 
information relative to the low arbitrage cost stocks (glamour stocks). 3) Last but not least, the 
thesis provides evidence that arbitrage risk is priced into stock returns, and stocks subject to high 
arbitrage risk commands a return premium. Accordingly, value premium can be viewed, to 
certain extent, as com pensation for bearing higher arbitrage risk, rather than systematic risk.
Chapter I. The Lead-Lag Structure between Value and Glamour Stocks
I. Introduction
M otivated by the evidence o f Lo and M acKinlay (1990) that the lead-lag relation between the 
returns o f  large stocks and those o f  small stocks partially contributes to the observed size 
premium, Chapter I o f  the thesis hypothesizes that a possible lead-lag structure between value and 
glamour returns can partially explain the value premium anomaly.
Chapter I is organized as follows. Section II discusses related literature and hypothesis 
development. Section III tests the lead-lag structure o f  mean returns between glamour and value 
portfolios. Section IV uses GARCH family specifications to test the asymmetric volatility 
spillover between glamour and value portfolios. Section V concludes.
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4II. Related Literature Review
The lead-lag structure between different size portfolios has been well documented in the 
finance literature. The returns o f  large-capitalization stocks almost always lead those o f  smaller 
stocks, suggesting an asymmetric assim ilation o f  information across different size stocks. Ever 
since the seminal paper o f Lo and M acKinlay (1990), who first docum ent the empirical evidence 
for the transm ission o f  information between large and small stocks, a series o f  studies propose 
and test hypotheses to explain the asymmetric information assimilation across different size 
stocks.
It has been well recognized that firm size per se may have little economic significance for the 
information transm ission across firms. However, firm size may be highly correlated with some 
firm characteristics that are relevant to the inform ation transmission. One explanation is that size 
is positively correlated w ith investor recognition, or the num ber o f  individuals who are interested 
in a firm and therefore more information is produced for large firms by those individuals (M erton 
1987). Asymmetric information diffusion associated w ith investor recognition has gained 
consistent empirical support. For instance, Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) find that 
firms with high analyst coverage tend to respond more rapidly to market returns than do firms 
with low analyst coverage. Badrinath, Kale and Noe (1995) document that returns o f  the stocks 
with the higher level o f institutional ownership lead returns o f  the stocks w ith the lower levels of 
institutional ownership. Hou and M oskow itz (2005) show that delayed firms earn higher return, 
and the delay premium is explained by the proxies for investor recognition such as analyst 
coverage and institutional ownership.
If  the faster reaction to new information on the large cap stocks relative to the small cap 
stocks can be attributed to the positive correlation o f  speed o f  information adjustm ent with 
investor recognition, it is reasonable to conjecture that glamour stocks react faster than value 
stocks to new information, since glamour stocks tend to have greater investor recognition such as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5greater analyst coverage and institutional ownership than value stocks. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that mean returns o f  glamour stocks will lead those o f  value stocks.
The asymmetric price adjustment can be reflected not only in the lead-lag relation o f  mean 
returns, but also in the unidirectional volatility spillover between portfolio returns. That is, if  the 
return volatility o f  portfolio A has an impact on the return volatility o f  portfolio B, whereas the 
return volatility o f  portfolio B has no impact on the return volatility o f  portfolio A, then the 
conclusion can be made that the return volatility o f  portfolio A leads that o f  portfolio B. Using the 
GARCH family o f  statistical processes, Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (1991) find that the volatility 
shocks to larger firms are important to the future dynamics o f  the returns o f smaller firms as well 
as to their own returns. Conversely, the volatility shocks to smaller firms have no impact on either 
the conditional m ean or the variance o f  the returns o f  larger firms. Consistent with the findings o f 
Conrad, G ultekin and Kaul (1991) regarding the different size portfolios, we hypothesize that 
there exists a unidirectional volatility spillover between glamour and value portfolios, with the 
volatility shocks o f  glam our stocks having an impact on the return volatility o f  value stocks, but 
not visa versa.
According to Lo and M acKinlay (1990), lead-lag structure can partially explain the observed 
contrarian profits. For example, if  glamour stocks lead value stocks, the higher returns o f  glamour 
stocks in the portfolio form ation period imply higher returns o f value stocks in the next period, 
thus value stocks or the loser stocks at the form ation period can follow glam our stocks to be the 
winner o f  next period, generating observed value profit. Therefore the investigation o f  the lead- 
lag structure between glamour and value stocks has implications for the existence o f value 
premium.
III. Lead-Lag Structure between Value and Glamour Mean Returns
III.l Data
Following Davis, Fam a and French (2000), portfolios are constructed in a two-by-three sort 
on size and B/M. W ithin each o f  the two size quartiles, the stocks are further allocated to three
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6book-to-market portfolios. Controlling firm size is important because we already know from the 
evidence o f Lo and M acKinlay (1990) that returns o f  larger stocks always lead the returns o f 
smaller stocks. Holding firm size constant allows us to distinguish the value/glam our effect from 
a pure size effect on the lead-lag structure across stock returns. All returns are calculated in 
excess o f  the Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. The market return is the value- 
weighted return on all NYSE, AM EX, and NASDAQ stocks w ith book equity data for the 
previous calendar year. To be consistent w ith earlier studies in the asymmetric information 
assimilation literature (Lo and M acKinlay 1990, Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul 1991, Jegadeesh and 
Titman 1995), the empirical tests use weekly return d a ta .1 One advantage o f  using weekly returns 
rather than daily returns is that the positive cross-autocorrelation generated by different 
nontrading probabilities for different portfolio groups is virtually eliminated. The sample includes 
2188 weekly observations for each o f  the six size-B/M  portfolios. The weekly returns are 
calculated as average daily returns during the week, and all the daily portfolio return data from 
July 1, 1963 to M ay 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s w eb site .2
III.2 B/M  Portfolio Statistics
Table 1 reports the size-B/M  portfolio statistics. Consistent with the docum entation o f  value 
premium, the m ean return increases as the B/M  ratio increases within both size groups. However, 
the standard deviation o f  the weekly return decreases w ith the B/M ratio within both size groups. 
In the all stock panel, the m ean weekly return o f  value (high B/M) stocks is 0.2889, larger than 
the mean weekly return o f  the glamour (low  B/M ) stocks, 0.2010. However, the standard 
deviation o f  value stocks is 1.9293, smaller than the standard deviation o f  glam our stocks, 2.2869. 
These results cast doubt on the fundamental risk explanation for the value premium which claims 
that the higher returns o f  value stocks are com pensation for bearing higher fundamental risk
1 We obtained similar results using the daily and monthly portfolio returns data.
2 Professor Kenneth French data URL is: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/facultv/ken.french/data library
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7on the part o f  the investors holding value stocks. In addition, there is strong tendency within both 
size groups for the autocorrelations to increase in terms o f  both absolute value and significance as 
the B/M  ratio increases. In the all stock panel, the autocorrelation o f one lag is 0.008 for glamour 
stocks and 0.088 for value stocks, and the Q -stat is insignificant (0.133) for glamour stocks and 
highly significant (16.849) for value stocks. If  a slow adjustment to new information manifests 
itself in positive autocorrelation, this finding o f  stronger autocorrelation for the high B/M 
portfolios relative to the low B/M  portfolios seems to suggest asym m etric information 
assimilation across B/M  portfolios, w ith new information absorbed faster among the low B/M 
stocks and slower am ong the high B/M  stocks.
[Insert Table 1 here]
III.3 Cross-Autocorrelation Tests
Following Lo and M acKinlay (1990), we investigate the lead-lag relationship in portfolio 
returns based on cross-autocorrelations analysis. Table 2 presents the cross-autocorrelation 
matrices for the weekly portfolio return series. Since the focus o f  our tests is to identify the 
relationship between value and glamour stocks, we restricted our attention to the two extreme 
portfolios w ithin each size group with the lowest (R(g)) and the highest (R(v)) B/M  ratios.
Consistent w ith our hypothesis that glam our stock returns lead value stock returns, we find 
that the correlations o f  lagged glam our portfolio returns R(g, t-1) and R(g, t-2) w ith the value 
portfolio contemporaneous returns R(v, t) are greater than the correlations o f lagged value 
portfolio returns R(v, t-1) and R(v, t-2) w ith the glamour portfolio contemporaneous returns R(g, 
t).3 In the all stock columns, the correlation between R(g, t-1) and R(v, t) is significant and 
positive, 0.0608, whereas the correlation between R(v, t-1) and R(g, t) is insignificant
3 We test the correlation between contemporaneous and lagged returns up to 4 weeks lag. The asymmetry between the 
correlations o f  lagged glamour portfolio returns with the value portfolio contemporaneous returns and the correlations 
o f  lagged value portfolio returns with the glamour portfolio contemporaneous returns disappears after 2 weeks lag. 
Therefore we only report correlation results up to 2 weeks lag.
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8and negative, -0.0132. The correlation between R(g, t-2) and R(v, t) is significant and positive,
0.0461, whereas the correlation between R(v, t-2) and R(g, t) is positive but insignificant, 0.0052. 
This pattern o f  asymmetry, robust in all size groups, is indicative o f  the lead-lag relations 
between the glamour portfolio returns and the value portfolio returns, w ith the glamour returns 
leading the value returns.
[Insert Table 2 here]
To further investigate the lead-lag relations in the weekly returns we estimate the following 
regression specifications as suggested by Badrinath, et al (1995). A gain we restrict our attention 
to the two portfolios w ithin each size group that has the lowest (R(g)) and the highest (R(v)) B/M 
ratio.
K  = a + P o R g , r +  P - \ R g , t - 1 +  P - 2  R g , t - 2 +  P - 2  R g , , -  3 +  £ l [ 1 ]
Rg t = a+  fi0Rvl +/3_lRVJ_l +P^2Rv,,-2 P-2Rv,t~3 + £, [2]
W here R(g, t) and R(v, t) are the contemporaneous excess returns o f  the lowest and highest B/M 
portfolios. R(g, t-i) and R(v, t-i) are the excess return i months earlier on glamour and value 
portfolios, i =  1, 2, 3 in our regression. Contemporaneous and lagged returns o f  the lowest B/M  
(glamour) portfolio are predictors for returns o f  the highest B/M  (value) portfolio in Equation[l]; 
Contemporaneous and lagged returns o f  the highest B/M  (value) portfolio are predictors for 
returns o f  the lowest B/M (glamour) portfolio in Equation[2], To be consistent with our
hypothesis that glamour stock returns lead value stock returns, we expect to find that one or more
o f the coefficients o f  the lagged glamour portfolio returns in Equation[l] are positive significant, 
whereas the coefficients o f  the lagged value portfolio returns in Equation[2] are insignificant or 
less significant than the coefficients in Equation[l].
Table 3 reports the regression estim ation results. As expected, we find a significant positive 
correlation between contemporaneous value weekly returns and lagged glamour weekly returns 
for up to a two week lag for all size groups. W e also find significant negative correlation between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9contemporaneous glam our weekly returns and lagged value weekly returns for up to a two week 
lag for all size groups. In the “all stock” column, the coefficients o f  one week and two week 
lagged glamour returns in explaining the contemporaneous value returns are both positive and 
significant, w ith 0.0458 for one week lag and 0.0284 for two week lag. One the other hand, the 
coefficients o f  one week and two w eek lagged value returns in explaining the contemporaneous 
glamour returns are both negative and significant, -0.0975 for one week lag and -0.0542 for two 
week lag. The existence o f  the significant positive correlation between the lagged glamour 
returns and the contemporaneous value returns provides support to the hypothesis that glamour 
stock returns lead the value stock returns. Furthermore, the finding o f  negative correlation 
between the lagged value returns and the contemporaneous glamour returns rejects the existence 
o f  a feed-back relationship, in which glamour returns lead (cause) value returns, and also value 
return lead (cause) glamour return. This thus lends further support to the unidirectional lead-lag 
hypothesis between glamour and value stocks.
[Insert Table 3 here]
IV. Volatility Spillover between Value and Glamour Stocks 
The cross-correlation tests in Section III provide evidence supporting the existence of 
asymmetry in the predictability o f  m ean returns between value and glam our stocks. Although 
such an asymmetry does suggest that there are important differences in the dynamics o f  the stock 
prices o f  firms categorized on the basis o f  B/M  ratio, it may not necessarily imply that 
information is transm itted from lowest to highest B/M  firms. Ross (1989) shows that the variance 
o f  price changes is related directly to the rate o f  flow o f  information. Bollerslev et al (1992) show 
that speculative price changes are interwoven w ith higher moment dependencies. Cheung and N g 
(1996) also argue that volatility spillovers are important because changes in volatility reflect the 
arrival o f  information. Hence, to gain a better understanding about the asym m etric information 
assimilation process across value and glamour stocks, we examine empirically the pattern o f 
stock return volatility spillover between value and glamour stocks in this section.
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10
In the spirit o f  Conrad et al (1991), who find a unidirectional volatility spillover effect from 
larger firms to small firms, we first estimate a GARCH(1,1)-M  model for the lowest B/M 
(glamour) and highest B/M  (value) portfolios separately, and then introduce the lagged squared 
errors for glamour and value portfolios as an exogenous variable in the conditional variance 
equation o f  the value and glamour portfolios respectively. To be consistent w ith the hypothesis 
o f the lead-lag relation between glamour and value stocks, we expect to show that the lagged 
squared errors for the glamour portfolios play a significant role in determ ining the conditional 
variance o f  the value portfolios.
IV. 1 Univariate GARCH model
We apply the GARCH(1,1)-M  specification to the weekly return series o f  the lowest B/M  
(glamour) and highest B/M (value) portfolios separately to derive the error terms for the volatility 
spillover tests. To be consistent w ith the models used to test the mean return spillover in section 
III, we also include the concurrent and lagged returns o f  the other portfolio in the mean return 
equations. Furthermore, inclusion o f  the lagged returns o f  the other portfolio in the m ean return 
equations ensures that all asymmetry in the predictability o f  mean returns is purged from the error 
term. This is important because an asymmetric spillover in the mean return could rem ain in the 
error term  and show up as asymmetric responses o f  conditional variances to shocks. The 
estimated models are:
K .  = a + PoR g,t + P -\R s,,-\ +  y&v,, + £ v,i
h v t= a  + v2,_! + chvt_y [3]
and
R g ,t =  a + f i o R v,< + 7 a g,< + £ g,t
h g ,t = a  +  b £ l , - i  +  c h g , ' - i  W
where R(g, t) and R(v,t) are the contemporaneous excess returns o f the lowest and highest B/M 
portfolios. R(g, t-1) and R(v, t-1) are the excess return 1 week earlier on glamour and value
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portfolios. /?_j measures the impact o f  the lagged returns o f  the glamour (value) portfolio on the 
conditional mean o f  the value (glamour) portfolio. The <7 is the standard deviation o f  the 
conditional variance o f  the error term.
Table 4 reports the estimation results. The coefficients o f  the GARCH(1,1) terms ( b and c ) 
are always statistically significant, confirming the existence o f a GARCH effect and providing 
statistical support for the use o f  the GARCH specification. Consistent with the findings in Section
III, we find a significant asymmetry in the predictability o f  mean returns between the value and 
glamour portfolios. The lagged weekly returns o f  glamour stocks are positively correlated with 
the contemporaneous weekly returns o f  value stocks while the lagged weekly returns o f value 
stocks are negative correlated w ith the contemporaneous weekly returns o f  glamour stocks. In the 
“all stock” column, the coefficient o f  one w eek lagged glamour returns in explaining the 
contemporaneous value returns is positively significant (0.0478), while the coefficient o f  one 
week lagged value returns in explaining the contemporaneous glamour returns are negatively 
significant, (-0.0777). The results are robust for all three size groups, supporting the existence o f 
a  unidirectional mean return spillover from glam our stocks to value stocks.
[Insert Table 4 here]
IV.2 Unidirectional Volatility Spillover
To examine empirically w hether there exists an asym m etric volatility spillover effect between 
value and glamour stocks, we interpret the squared residuals from Equations [3] and [4] as a 
“volatility shock” to value and glamour stocks respectively, and then append this “volatility 
shock” variable to the conditional variance o f  Equations [4] and [3] to estimate the relation 
between the conditional variance o f  value (glamour) portfolio returns and the lagged squared 
shocks to glamour (value) portfolio returns:
K , t =  a + PoRgj + P- iRg,t-i +  y&v,t + £ v,t
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/?„_,= a + b e 2,_! +  chv t + cf e2 [5] 
and
-Kg>, = «  + P 0R Vil + + ycr g_, + s  g
hg,i= a  +  b £ 2g<_ i +  chg +  d £ 2vl_{ [6]
“d” measures the impact o f  past volatility surprises o f  the glamour portfolio on the conditional 
variance o f  the value portfolio in Equation[5], and in Equation [6], d measures the impact o f  past 
volatility surprises o f  the value portfolio on the conditional variance o f the glamour portfolio. The
volatility surprises, £ g M and £ v2M are lagged squared residuals derived from Equations [4] and 
[3] respectively.
Table 5 reports the volatility spillover estim ation results. No indications o f  serious model 
misspecification are observed. Jensen’s alphas are insignificant for all size groups. The estimated 
coefficients o f  GARCH(1,1) terms (b and c) are always significant at 1%, confirming the 
existence o f  GARCH effects and providing statistical support for the use o f  the GARCH 
specification. Consistent w ith our expectations, we find a distinct asymmetry in volatility 
spillover between the glamour and value portfolios, w ith the past volatility surprise o f  the 
glamour portfolio positively and significantly influencing the conditional variance o f  the value 
portfolio. These coefficients are 0.0141, 0.0141 and 0.0216 for small, big and all stocks groups, 
respectively, whereas the past volatility surprise o f  the value portfolio is not significant in 
determining the conditional variance o f  the glam our portfolio. These coefficients are IE-6, 
8.8090E-20, and 6.3790E-21 for small, big and all stocks groups, respectively.
In addition, after introducing volatility spillover effects to the GARCH models, the 
asymmetry in the predictability o f  mean returns between glamour and value portfolios remains. 
The coefficients o f  lagged glamour returns in determining the contemporaneous value returns are 
always positive and significant. These coefficients are 0.0357, 0.0269 and 0.0473 for small, big 
and all stocks groups, respectively, whereas the coefficients o f  lagged value returns in
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determining the contemporaneous glamour returns are always negative and significant. These 
coefficients are -0.0626, -0.0616 and -0.0777 for small, big and all stocks groups, respectively.
[Insert Table 5 here]
V. Conclusion
We empirically test the lead-lag relationship in both the mean return and conditional volatility 
between value and glamour portfolios in Chapter I. The results provide evidence in support o f  a 
unidirectional spillover o f  both m ean returns and conditional volatilities between glamour and 
value stocks. Specifically, the glamour stocks lead the value stocks in both mean return and 
conditional volatility. The discovery o f  the lead-lag structure between value and glamour stocks 
provides a potential explanation for the existence o f  value premium. Furthermore, the lead-lag 
relationship implies important differences in the dynamics o f  the stock price changes between the 
value and glamour portfolios. That is, glam our stocks absorb new information faster than value 
stocks. To further explore this issue, we test the lead-lag price reaction to market- and firm- 
specific inform ation separately in Chapters II and III.
Chapter II. Costly Arbitrage and Asymmetric Stock Price Reactions to Common 
Information
I. Introduction
Chapter I showed that glamour stocks lead value stocks in both mean returns and conditional 
volatilities, suggesting that glamour stocks react to new information faster than value stocks. 
However, an individual firm ’s stock price reflects both common inform ation (market- and 
industry-level information) and firm-specific information. King (1966) provides evidence that 
stock returns covary w ith market and industry returns. Roll (1988) finds that only a small portion 
o f stock return variation is attributable to the general market and industry movements, suggesting 
that the residual returns reflect the firm-specific information. Since individual firms are
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influenced by both common economic fundamentals and events unique to the firms, the lead-lag 
relationship docum ented in Chapter I can be a m anifestation o f  the asymmetric price reaction to 
either common information or firm specific information or both. Therefore, to further address the 
issue o f  the lead-lag structure between glamour and value stocks, we test the asymmetric stock 
price reaction to common information and firm-specific information separately in Chapter II and
III. The role o f  costly arbitrage in explaining the delayed response o f  value stocks to new 
information is also investigated in these two Chapters.
Chapter II is organized as follows. Section II formally tests whether glamour stocks react to 
common inform ation faster than value stocks. Section III proposes that the higher arbitrage risk 
borne by the value stocks relative to glamour stocks delays the flow o f common information into 
value stocks. This section focuses on testing w hether value stocks are indeed exposed to higher 
arbitrage costs than glamour stocks in terms o f  both transaction costs and holding costs. Section 
IV concludes.
II. Asymmetric Reactions to Market Returns
II. 1 Related Literature Review
Existing research establishes an informational role for investor recognition. Brennan, 
Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) find that firms w ith high analyst coverage respond more 
rapidly to market information than do firms w ith low analyst coverage. Similarly, Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) find that the covariation o f  stock returns with market and industry returns is 
positively associated w ith analyst forecasting activities, suggesting that analyst forecasting 
activities increase stocks’ responsiveness to com m on information. Consistent w ith the argument 
that financial analyst activities accelerate the incorporation o f  common information into stock 
prices, we hypothesize that glamour stocks lead value stocks in reacting to common information, 
since glamour stocks tend to have greater analyst coverage than value stocks.
Brennan et al (1993) constructed a  formal test to investigate the asymmetry o f  reaction to 
common inform ation between high analyst coverage firms and low analyst coverage firms. The
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test looks at the pattern o f  price response o f zero net investment portfolios that are long in high 
analyst coverage stocks and short in low analyst coverage stocks to market returns, proxies for 
common information. The model they derived mathematically shows that when the zero net 
investment portfolio return is regressed on current and lagged market returns, a positive 
coefficient on current market return and a negative sum o f  the coefficients on lagged market 
returns will imply that high analyst coverage stocks react faster to common information than low 
analyst coverage stocks.
In the spirit o f  Brennan et al (1993), our formal tests o f  the difference between the speed of 
response to common inform ation o f  portfolios G (glamour, the lowest B/M  portfolio) and V 
(value, the highest B/M  portfolio) are constructed as follows. For each size group (small, big and 
all) the return on a zero net investm ent portfolio, w hich is long in portfolio G and short in 
portfolio V, is regressed against current and lags o f  the market returns, proxies for common 
information. Essentially, we are estim ating current and lagged market betas in Dimson 
regressions which allow for inform ation lags exceeding one period. Recent studies provide 
evidence o f  changing risk premium and returns variability over time (Campbell, et al 2001) and 
support the claim that the unconditional CAPM, w hich specifies a constant risk premium, 
generates biased and inconsistent betas and alphas estimates. To deal w ith the problem, we 
employ a GARCH specification o f  the Dim son regressions to capture the time-varying 
idiosyncratic volatility, m odeling Heteroscedasticity, and therefore generating efficient beta 
estimates. We therefore estimate the following regressions for each size group:
RgJ ~ K l = a  +  P oK ,,, +X P -k R m,t-k+ £ ,
k=1
h = a  + bs]_x + cht_x [ l ]
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where R(g, t) and R(v, t) are the contemporaneous excess returns o f  the lowest B/M  (glamour) 
and highest B/M  (value) portfolios. /30 is the current beta and ^7 fS_k refers to the sum o f lagged
k=1
betas. A gain following Brennan et al (1993), regressions are fitted w ith three and five lags (k=3 
and k=5).
Consistent w ith the conjecture that glam our stocks react faster to common inform ation than 
value stocks, we expect to find a significant positive /30 , the coefficient on current market returns 
and a negative ^  p ^  the sum o f  coefficients on lagged market returns.
k=1
11.2 Data
The size-B/M  portfolios are constructed exactly the same way as the portfolios in Chapter I 
(section III. 1 o f  Chapter I).
11.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Table I (section III.2 o f  Chapter I).
II. 4 Dim son Regression Results
Table 6 reports the Dim son regression estim ation results. No indications o f  serious model 
misspecification are observed. All GARCH(1,1) terms (b, c) are always significant at 1%, 
confirming the existence o f GARCH effects and providing statistical support for the use o f  the 
GARCH specification. The coefficients o f  the current market return P(0) are significantly positive 
for all size groups for both 3 and 5 lags. In the lag 3 regression, P(0) is 0.3025, 0.1925 and
0.2157 for small, big and all stocks respectively, indicating that glamour stocks are significantly 
more sensitive to contemporaneous market returns than value stocks. Furthermore, the sum o f the 
lag coefficients ( ^  p  ) is significantly negative for all size groups for both 3 and 5 lags. In the
k=\
lag 3 regression, ^  p  is -0.0029, -0.0750 and -0.1212 for small, big and all stocks respectively. 
1
Not only is the sum o f the lag coefficient negative, we find all the significant lagged market betas
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are negative. The negative lag coefficients combined with positive current coefficients reliably 
imply that glamour stocks react to common information faster then value stocks.
[Insert Table 6 here]
III. Arbitrage Costs and Asymmetric Reactions to Common Information 
III. 1 Related Literature Review
The results in Section II show that value stocks lag behind glamour stocks in absorbing the 
market information into their prices. This section explores the potential factors that inhibit the 
value stocks from reacting to market inform ation promptly. In other wordss, why does market 
efficiency, w hich requires prices to immediately reflect all relevant information, stumble more 
severely for value stocks than for glamour stocks.
Arbitrage mechanism is the vehicle that eliminates mispricing and delivers market efficiency. 
However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest, almost all arbitrage is costly and risky, which 
makes arbitrage unprofitable, and therefore deters risk averse arbitrageurs from trading against 
mispricing. Specifically, stocks w ith higher arbitrage costs should be less attractive to 
arbitrageurs. O n observing common market information, arbitrageurs may take smaller positions 
in stocks w ith higher arbitrage costs, and therefore m ispricing persists, and takes a longer time for 
those stocks to trade close to their fundamental value and reflect market information. Hence the 
stocks associated w ith high arbitrage costs exhibit a delayed price adjustm ent to the market 
information.
Prior costly arbitrage literature has focused on the effect o f  transaction cost, the “cost” part o f  
the arbitrage activities on market friction, however has failed to emphasize the importance o f  
idiosyncratic risk, the “risk” part o f  the arbitrage activities. Transaction cost has indeed been 
shown to plays an important role in dissipating arbitrage profits and limiting the rational arbitrage 
positions (e.g. Garman and Ohlson 1981, Knez and Ready 1996, and Barber et al. 2001). 
However, transaction cost alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for the existence of 
market friction (Ali, et al 2003). Recent studies start to pay more attention to the role o f
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idiosyncratic risk in market inefficiency. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that to specialized 
arbitrageurs, idiosyncratic volatility o f  the stock returns is o f  greater concern than systematic 
volatility, because idiosyncratic volatility can not be hedged. Similarly, Pontiff (2005) asserts that 
idiosyncratic risk, instead o f the system atic risk, is a holding cost because systematic risk can be 
offset in hedge positions. Pontiff (2005) reviews the empirical studies o f  the role o f  idiosyncratic 
risk in mispricing, and concludes that the common theme unifying this literature is that 
idiosyncratic risk appears to be the m ost important arbitrage costs that impede market efficiency. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that value stocks are exposed to both high unhedgeable 
idiosyncratic risk and high transaction costs that force arbitrageurs to refrain form establishing 
positions in value stocks, therefore, delaying incorporation o f market information into stock 
prices.
Furthermore, since idiosyncratic volatility represents a risk to arbitrageurs, and rational 
arbitrageurs m ust trade-off the risk o f  their position against the expected profit o f  the position, 
they will demand a higher return for bearing higher idiosyncratic risk. Therefore we argue that 
idiosyncratic risk commands a risk premium. The arbitrage risk premium should be strongest 
among the stocks w ith relatively high idiosyncratic risk and low systematic risk, because for 
those stocks, arbitrageurs care more about idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk, and the 
expected return w ill be more responsive to the fluctuation o f  idiosyncratic risk than the return of 
the stocks w ith relatively low arbitrage risk. I f  value stocks are indeed associated w ith higher 
idiosyncratic risk, we would expect to see a stronger arbitrage risk premium for value stocks 
relative to glamour stocks. Our first test o f  the section employs a GARCH-M  Dim son model to 
test whether returns o f  value stocks are more sensitive to the fluctuation o f  idiosyncratic risk than 
the returns o f  glamour stocks are. The test results have implications to the relative idiosyncratic 
risk exposure between value and glamour stocks. In addition, if  idiosyncratic risk is indeed priced 
into returns o f  value stocks, but not into the returns o f  glamour stocks, tentative conclusions can
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be made that value premium can be view ed, to certain extent, as com pensation for bearing high
arbitrage risk, and the value premium represents in part an arbitrage risk premium.
The second test in this section directly calculates and compares idiosyncratic risk and
to higher arbitrage costs.
III.2 GARCH-M  Dim son M arket M odel Specification
W e use a GARCH-M  market model to test the relative responsiveness o f  returns to changes 
in idiosyncratic risk between value and glamour stocks to achieve three goals: First, the
idiosyncratic volatility is calculated w ith respect to the market model so that the effect o f  
idiosyncratic volatility on the mean return can be separated from the effect o f  the market risk 
exposure on the mean return. Second, GARCH-M  specification models the relationship between 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility and the mean returns explicitly, showing whether the 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility has explanatory power beyond the market risk premium. Last, 
Dimson market model allows for the effect o f  lagged market returns on the portfolio returns, 
consistent w ith the context o f  the thesis, and the test conducted in last section. Therefore our 
regression specifications are as follows:
transaction costs between the value and glam our stocks to see if value stocks are indeed exposed
k
K , , = a  + f ioR m,t+ '£ J f i -k R m,l-k +  Ya ' , + £ l
h = a + + ch,_y [2]
and
k
h = a + b s ^  + ch,^
[3]
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where R(g, t) and R(v,t) are the contemporaneous excess returns o f  the lowest (glamour) and 
highest B/M  (value) portfolios. /? 0 is the current beta and ^  p  refers to the sum o f lagged
k =1
betas. Regressions are fitted w ith five lags (k = 5 ).4
Table 7 reports the GARCH-M  Dim son regression estimation results. N o indications o f 
serious model m isspecification are observed. A ll GARCH(1,1) terms (b, c) are always significant 
at 1%, confirm ing the existence o f  GARCH effects and providing statistical support for the use o f  
GARCH-M  specification. The main findings o f  table 7 are that value stocks are more responsive 
to changes in idiosyncratic volatility and less responsive to changes in market returns relative to 
glamour stocks. For all stocks regressions, the coefficient o f  current market return for value 
portfolio is 0.8704, significantly smaller than the coefficient o f current market return |3(0) for 
glamour portfolio o f  1.0797. However, GARCH-M  terms ( y )  are significantly positive for value 
stocks, but not significant for glamour stocks across all size groups. The coefficients o f  the 
idiosyncratic volatilities for value stocks are 0.3889, 0.1854, and 0.1779 in small, big and all 
stocks regressions respectively. These findings are consistent w ith our hypothesis that value 
stocks load more on idiosyncratic risk relative to glamour stocks. Furthermore, the results that 
value stocks are less sensitive to market returns and more sensitive to idiosyncratic volatilities 
than glamour stocks imply that the value premium, the higher returns earned by value stocks than 
glamour stocks, should not represent com pensation for bearing high systematic risk, but 
com pensation for bearing high idiosyncratic risk or arbitrage risk on the part o f  value stocks 
instead.
[Insert Table 7 here]
4
Regressions fitted with 3 lags generate similar results.
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III.3 Com parison o f  Arbitrage Costs Across B/M Portfolios
The following test directly calculates and compares the idiosyncratic risk and transaction 
costs between value and glamour portfolios to see w hether value stocks have higher arbitrage 
costs exposure than glamour stocks.
1. Variables Description
To address the potential effects o f  arbitrage costs on the lead-lag price adjustment to market 
information between value and glamour stocks, this test uses residual errors from the market 
model to capture idiosyncratic risk, and uses price and volum e to capture transaction costs. The 
motivation and the construction o f these proxies are as follows:
A. Idiosyncratic risk
Idiosyncratic volatility poses a significant holding cost to arbitrageurs because it can not be 
offset in hedge positions. A stock’s idiosyncratic volatility is commonly estim ated as the residual 
variance from a regression o f  its return on the returns o f  its proper substitutes. The selection o f  
proper substitutes varies from study to study based on the specific needs o f each study. Pontiff 
(1996) calculates idiosyncratic risk relative to the excess return o f  ten mutual funds when he tests 
how the idiosyncratic risk relates to mispricing, measured by the close-end fund discounts. 
W urgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) estim ated the idiosyncratic risk relative to returns o f  the stocks 
o f  sim ilar size, sim ilar book-to-m arket ratio and o f  same industry. Other studies constructed 
idiosyncratic risk relative to market index returns (Ali, et al. 2003, Pontiff and Schill 2004, 
M endenhall 2004). As an empirical matter, M ashruwala, et al. (2005) demonstrate that the 
construction o f idiosyncratic volatilities does not affect the results. In this study, we estimate the 
idiosyncratic risk relative to the CRSP value-weighted index. To minimize the possible size and 
value effects on the return residuals, we also estimate the idiosyncratic volatilities using the FF- 
three factor model.
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B. Transaction costs proxies
The transaction costs literature has shown that both price and volume are negatively 
associated with transaction costs: the higher the price and the volume, the lower the transaction 
cotss. Stoll (2000) finds that recent stock price and recent dollar trading volume are significantly 
related to the bid-ask spread. Similarly, Bhushan (1994) argues stock price is negatively 
associated w ith commissions, and the dollar trading volume is negatively related to the cost o f 
trading like price pressure. In this study, we use both PRICE and VOLUM E to measure 
transaction costs. PRICE is the closing daily stock price averaged over all trading days during a 
year. VOLUM E is the closing daily stock price times daily shares traded averaged over all trading 
days during a  year.
2. Sample and Data
The sample data come from two sources. Book-to-m arket data is from COM PUSTAT. Price, 
volume and return data are from the Daily CRSP. Because B/M  ratio data is only available since 
1986, the sample period spans from calendar year 1987 to 2005 for w hich complete data are 
available, consisting o f  66,568 total firm observations, including both exchange-traded and 
NASDAQ stocks.
Three equal sized book-to-m arket portfolios are formed at the beginning o f  each calendar 
year from 1987 to 2005 based on the B/M  ratio com puted at prior calendar year end. Specifically, 
B/M ratio is defined as the ratio o f  book value o f  common equity (item  #60) to market value o f 
the equity (item #199 x item #25) at prior calendar year end. We exclude all ADR, foreign firms, 
and all financial companies.
Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for all the arbitrage cost variables discussed earlier. 
The statistics generally agree w ith the pervious documentation. The distributions o f  PRICE and 
VOLUM E are very comparable to those reported by Bartov, et al. (2000). In panel A, the m ean o f 
the idiosyncratic volatility o f  full sample is 0.0412, estim ated from the market model regression 
o f  stocks’ daily returns on CRSP value-weighted index and is bigger than those reported in
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W urgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) from the same m arket model. They report a residual variance o f
0.000372 (idiosyncratic volatility is 0.0193). The difference is not surprising because their sample 
includes only the S&P 500, including generally large-cap firms, and exhibiting less idiosyncratic 
volatilities. We also find that the distributions o f  residual errors estimated from the market model 
and those estim ated from the FF-three factor model are very similar. The mean residual errors 
differ only by 0.0004 in the full sample analysis. This is consistent with the view  o f  M ashruwala, 
et al. (2005) that the estim ation o f  idiosyncratic volatilities does not depend on the asset pricing 
specification.
Then we compare the statistics in panel B and C for value and glamour portfolios respectively. 
Consistent with our hypothesis that value stocks have higher idiosyncratic risk exposure, we find 
the mean idiosyncratic risk estim ated from market model for value stocks (4.7%) is 0.6%  higher 
than that o f  glam our stocks (4.1%). This result is robust to the alternate construction o f 
idiosyncratic risk estim ated from a FF-three factor model. Similar pattern is found for transaction 
cost variables. The m ean price and dollar volume o f  value stocks are significantly lower than 
those o f  glam our stocks by $11,452 and $17,771 m illion respectively, indicating that value stocks 
are exposed to higher transaction cost than glamour stocks do.
[Insert Table 8 here]
3. D etailed Comparison Results
Table 9 reports the detailed comparison o f  arbitrage costs across three equally sized B/M 
ratio portfolios for each year over the 1987 to 2005 period. Consistent w ith the summary statistics 
results in Table 8, we find that idiosyncratic volatilities o f  value stocks are significantly higher 
than those o f  glamour stocks in 13 out o f  19 years. Price and the volume o f  value stocks are 
significantly lower than those o f glamour stocks in all years. The results provides evidence that 
value stocks are exposed to both higher idiosyncratic risk and higher transaction costs, causing a 
slower response to market information on the part o f  the value stocks relative to glamour stocks.
[Insert Table 9 here]
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IV. Conclusion
Chapter II form ally tests asymmetric price response to common inform ation between value 
and glamour stocks. Consistent w ith the findings o f  Chapter I that value stocks lag behind 
glamour stocks in terms o f  both mean return and volatilities, the results in Chapter II show that 
the value stocks ’response to market information is slower than that o f  glamour stocks. We 
propose that the higher arbitrage costs borne by the value stocks relative to the glamour stocks is 
the reason for slow absorption o f  common inform ation into value stock prices. Through a 
thorough com parison o f  arbitrage costs o f  value and glamour stocks, we find strong evidence that 
value stocks are associated w ith both higher idiosyncratic risk and higher transaction costs than 
are glamour stocks. This is consistent w ith our hypothesis that the slower price adjustm ent to 
market inform ation on the part o f  value stocks can be partially attributed to the higher arbitrage 
costs borne by the value stocks. Furthermore, the results from testing the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risk and expected returns show that idiosyncratic risk is priced into the returns o f 
value stocks, but not into the returns o f  glamour stocks, suggesting that value stocks load more on 
idiosyncratic risk. The results also have implications on explaining the existence o f  value 
premium, that is, value premium may represent an arbitrage premium, and value profit is 
com pensation for bearing higher arbitrage risk.
Chapter III. Costly Arbitrage and Asymmetric Price Drift to Firm-Specific Information -
Earnings Announcement
I. Introduction
Chapter II showed that values stocks are associated w ith high arbitrage costs that forces 
arbitrageurs to refrain from establishing positions in value stocks, leading to a slower price 
adjustment to market information. Then the next natural question is whether the higher arbitrage 
costs borne by value stocks causes slower price reaction to firm-specific information as well.
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M endenhall (2004) shows that the post earnings announcement drift over the next quarter is 
stronger for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that high idiosyncratic risk impedes 
fast flow o f firm-specific information into stock prices. Consistent w ith his finding, we 
hypothesize in Chapter III that value stocks react to firm-specific information more slowly than 
glamour stocks, because they are associated w ith high idiosyncratic risk.
Chapter III is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related literature and develops 
hypotheses. Section III form ally tests w hether glamour stocks react to firm-specific information 
more prom ptly than do value stocks. Since slower price adjustm ent to the firm-specific 
information is associated w ith longer and stronger price drift after the event dates, we expect to 
find that value stocks experience longer and stronger post event price drift than do glamour stocks. 
Section IV proposes that the higher arbitrage costs borne by the value stocks relative to glamour 
stocks is the reason for slower response to firm-specific information on the part o f  value stocks, 
resulting in longer and stronger post event price drift, and tests how idiosyncratic risk explains the 
asymmetric post earnings announcem ent drift between value and glamour stocks.
II. Related Literature Review
Our main hypothesis in Chapter III is that high idiosyncratic risk borne by value stocks 
causes a slower price adjustment to firm -specific information. This hypothesis is motivated by 
two findings. First, idiosyncratic risk is a major deterrent to market efficiency. Second, value 
stocks are exposed to higher idiosyncratic risk.
Existing research has established the role o f  idiosyncratic risk in impeding market efficiency. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that idiosyncratic risk matters more to specialized arbitrageurs 
than systematic risk does, because idiosyncratic risk can not be hedged. Pontiff (2005) reviews 
the empirical studies on the role o f  idiosyncratic risk in mispricing, and concludes that 
idiosyncratic risk appears to be the m ost important deterrent to market efficiency. On observing 
firm-specific information, arbitrageurs may take smaller positions in stocks w ith higher arbitrage 
costs. If  investors tend to underreact to the value implications o f firm news, then high arbitrage
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cost stocks w hich are less attractive to arbitrageurs w ill produce more severe underreation and 
exhibit greater drift. M endenhall (2004) shows that post earnings announcement drift over the 
next quarter is stronger for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that securities subject 
to higher idiosyncratic risk react to firm-specific inform ation more slowly than securities subject 
to lower idiosyncratic risk. M otivated by the above evidence from the literature and the our 
findings in Chapter II that value stocks are exposed to higher idiosyncratic risk than are glamour 
stocks, we hypothesize that the high idiosyncratic risk borne by value stocks impedes the prompt 
flow o f firm-specific information into stock prices, resulting in greater post event price drift.
Since a slow response to firm-specific information can be m anifested through stronger and 
longer price drift after the event date, we test the asymmetric price reaction to firm-specific 
information between value and glamour stocks by comparing their post event price drift. 
Specifically, we test and compare the post earnings announcem ent drift (PEAD) between value 
and glamour stocks.
Post Earnings Announcem ent D rift (PEAD) is the tendency for stocks to earn high positive 
average abnormal returns in the m onths subsequent to positive earnings surprises, and to earn 
negative average abnorm al returns in the months subsequent to negative earnings surprises. 
PEAD has been docum ented in the literature for at least 3 decades. This enduring feature o f  stock 
prices to gradually, rather than im m ediately adjust to earnings surprises has been widely regarded 
as an anom aly from the perspective o f  efficient market hypothesis (e.g., Ball and Brown 1968, 
Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990, and Bernard, Thomas and W ahlen 1997).
Bernard and Thomas (1990) provide evidence in support o f  the market inefficiency 
explanation. They show that following the earnings surprise, the three-day stock returns around 
subsequent earnings announcements exhibit positive and declining first, second, and third order 
autocorrelation and negative fourth order autocorrelation. This autocorrelation pattern is 
consistent w ith the market inefficiency hypothesis that stock prices initially underreact to 
earnings surprise, and then drift in the same direction in subsequent months.
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If PEAD indeed represents a delayed price response to new  information, as argued by 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990, and 1992), the earnings announcem ent serves as an appropriate 
context in which we can test the asymmetric price response to firm-specific information between 
value and glamour stocks. To be consistent w ith our main hypothesis that value stocks absorb 
firm-specific information more slowly than glamour stocks, we expect to see that value stocks 
experience stronger and longer post earnings announcement drift than do glamour stocks. In other 
wordss, if  both value and glamour stocks underreact to earnings surprises, value stocks should 
underreact more severely, resulting in stronger and longer post announcem ent drift. Our testable 
hypothesis is that value stocks should produce relatively higher abnormal returns following good 
news and relatively lower abnormal returns following bad news.
III. Asymmetric Post Earnings Announcement Drift between Value and Glamour Stocks
III. 1 Sample and M ethodology
The sample data come from tw o sources. Book-to-market data and quarterly earning 
announcement date (item RDQ in COM PUSTAT) come from COM PUSTAT. Returns come 
from the CRSP. The sample period spans from the first fiscal quarter o f  1994 through the third
5
fiscal quarter o f  2005.
We use quarterly earnings announcements as firm-specific news events. Following Franzzini 
(2006), earnings surprises are m easured using the market model cumulative abnormal returns in a 
3-day w indow (-1, 0 and 1) around the quarterly earnings announcem ent dates. Following Doukas 
et al (2002), book-to-m arket is defined as the ratio o f  book value o f  com m on equity (item  #60) to 
market value o f  the equity (item #199 x item #25) at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the 
quarterly earnings announcement. W e exclude all ADR, foreign firms, and all financial 
companies. To avoid any potential IPO effects, we exclude stocks w ith less than 255 days o f
5
The quarterly earning announcement date (COMPUSTAT item RDQ) is only available for fiscal period o f  first 
quarter o f  1994 to the third quarter o f  2005.
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return data prior to the earnings announcem ent dates on CRSP. The final sample includes 
154,864 total firm observations.
To test the hypothesis that value stocks are associated w ith relatively higher (lower) abnormal 
returns following good (bad) news, we assign stocks to portfolios based on the nature o f  the news 
and the B/M  ratio. This is a standard approach in asset pricing, which reduces return variability. 
Starting from the first quarter o f  1994, at each quarterly earnings announcem ent we classify 
earnings surprises into three equal sized news groups based on the market model cumulative 
abnormal return in the 3-day w indow  (-1, 0, 1), and we define the group w ith the lowest 33% 
CAR as the bad news group and the group w ith the highest 33% CAR as the good news group. 
W ithin both good and bad news groups, stocks are further sorted into five equally sized B/M 
quintiles based on the B/M  ratio calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the quarterly 
earnings announcement.
III.2 Empirical Tests
A. Portfolio Post-Earnings Announcem ent Returns by B/M  Ratio
The first set o f  the empirical tests examines the variation in post-earnings announcem ent 
returns across B/M  quintile portfolios. Table 10 reports the average m onthly portfolio returns at 
month (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3) following the earnings announcement. The three news groups are 
sorted based on the earnings surprise at m onth t, and the five B/M portfolios are sorted based on 
the B/M  ratio calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the earnings announcement. Our 
attention falls on the lowest 20% (glamour) and the highest 20% (value) portfolios, and we expect 
to see that value stocks generate higher (lower) m onthly returns following good (bad) news 
relative to the glam our stocks in each o f the three post-earnings announcem ent months. Since 
earnings news is released on a quarterly basis, the focus o f  the analysis is on the short-term 
underreaction, and our tests are only designed for three months following the earnings news. 
Consistent w ith our expectations, we find that value stocks produce significant higher monthly 
returns than glamour stocks in each o f  three months following the good earnings surprise. The
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results show that value stocks outperform  glamour stocks by 1.50%, 1.53% and 1.78% in the first, 
second, and the third post-earnings announcem ent m onths respectively. For the bad news cases, 
however, value stocks do not seem to produce lower post-earnings monthly returns than glamour 
stocks. In fact, glam our stocks have lower m onthly returns than value stocks in all three months 
subsequent to earnings announcements. Does this result contradict our hypothesis? If  we take into 
consideration the value premium evidence that value stocks always earn higher returns than 
glamour stocks, we can conclude that the lower post earnings announcem ent m onthly return 
following bad news on the part o f  glamour stocks is not surprising and it does not necessarily 
imply that glam our stocks exhibit stronger underreaction to bad news than value stocks. However, 
since we do not control for the size and value effect in the analysis o f  m onthly raw  returns, 
comparison o f  the post earnings announcem ent raw  returns can not provide us w ith conclusive 
evidence as to which portfolio, value or glamour, is associated with a stronger price drift.
[Insert Table 10 here]
B. Post-Earnings Announcem ent Drift, M onthly Alphas by B/M  Ratio
To purge the drift factor from the size and value premium effect, we compute abnormal 
returns from a regression o f  the portfolio excess returns on contemporaneous Fam a and French 
factors downloaded from Professor French’s website. If  the three factor model can capture the 
cross-sectional variation in stock returns, the intercept from the following regression should be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
R:i — cc +  P  R ml+SSMB, +  (/>HMLI +  £ jt [1]
i = value, glamour portfolio
Where Rit is the monthly return o f the highest (value) and the lowest B/M  (glamour) portfolios in 
excess o f  one-m onth treasury bill rate. R ml is the value-weighted market return in excess o f  one- 
month treasury bill rate. SMB and HML are size premium and value premium factors. The 
Alphas represent the abnormal returns. Positive a  following good news indicates the presence o f
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post event drift, and the opposite is true for bad news. Under the hypothesis that value stocks 
produce stronger and longer drift than glamour stocks, we expect to see larger and longer lasting 
post earnings announcem ent alphas for value stocks.
Table 11 reports the m onthly alphas o f  value and glamour portfolios for each o f  the three 
months subsequent to earnings announcements. In the cases o f  good news, significantly positive 
alphas are observed for value stocks in each o f  the three months following earnings 
announcements. The risk-adjusted returns for value stocks are 0.8527%, 1.7069%, and 2.8412% 
in the first, second and third m onth following the good news, respectively. On the other hand, 
glamour stocks produce significant positive returns only in the second month following the good 
news, and both the magnitude (0.5025% ) and the significance (t=2.40) o f  the risk-adjusted return 
is much smaller than those o f  value stocks (1.7069%, t=8.87). For the bad earnings 
announcements, value stocks produce significantly negative alphas (-0.7945%, t=-3.91) in the 
first m onth following the bad news. On the other hand, neither significant negative nor positive 
price drift is observed for glamour stocks, suggesting that glamour stocks do not under- or over­
react to bad earnings announcements. To summarize, the monthly alpha results show that value 
stocks exhibit stronger and longer post earnings announcement drift than glamour stocks 
following both good and bad earnings announcements, therefore, confirming our hypothesis that 
value stocks react more slowly to firm-specific information.
In addition to the findings that value stocks exhibit a strong underreaction to earnings 
announcements, there is evidence that value stocks overreact to bad earnings announcem ents after 
an initial underreaction. The risk-adjusted m onthly returns for value stocks are significantly 
positive in the second (1.4567% , t=6.93) and third months (1.6064%, t=6.63) following bad 
earnings announcements. The findings that value stocks exhibit underreation in the first month 
and overreaction in the second and third months subsequent to bad earnings announcem ents are 
consistent w ith the unified theory o f  short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction to new 
information (Hong and Stein, 1999), which predicts that price reversal should be more
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pronounced in the stocks for which information diffuses more slowly. The results also provide 
explanations for the puzzles we observe in test A, that is, why value stocks have higher monthly 
returns than glam our stocks in the second and third m onth following bad earnings announcements. 
It is an overreaction in value stocks instead o f  a stronger underreaction in glam our stocks 
following bad earnings surprises that contributes to the phenomena. In general both the 
underreaction and overreaction market biases are heavily loaded in value stocks instead of 
glamour stocks following earnings announcem ent surprises, suggesting that the high arbitrage 
costs borne by value stocks force arbitrageurs to refrain from taking positions in eliminating 
tem porary m ispricing in value stocks. On the other hand, glamour stocks are associated w ith low 
arbitrage costs, hence arbitrageurs are more w illing to take positions in elim inating temporary 
m ispricing in glamour stocks, and therefore, no pronounced underreaction or overreaction is 
observed for glam our stocks following earnings announcements.
A nother finding worth noting is that good earnings announcements produce more severe 
price drift than do bad earnings announcements. A significant negative PEAD occurs only in the 
first m onth following bad earnings announcem ents in value stocks, whereas the significant 
positive price drift following good earnings announcements is observed in both value and 
glamour stocks, and lasts for three months for value stocks. These results imply that stocks react 
to negative earnings surprises more prom ptly and strongly than they do to positive earnings 
surprises. In fact, we find that value stocks overreact to bad earnings surprises. This is consistent 
with the docum ented asymmetric price response to good versus bad news. That is, bad news 
triggers a bigger shock to security prices than does good news, and the market reacts more 
strongly to bad news than to good news (Bernard, Thomas, and W ahlen 1997, La Porta, 
Lakonishock, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Skinner and Sloan 1998, and Conrad, Cornell and 
Landsman 1999).
[Insert Table 11 here]
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IV. Arbitrage Costs and Asym m etric Post Earnings Announcem ent Drift
Consistent w ith our main hypothesis o f  this chapter that value stocks react more slowly than 
glamour stocks to firm-specific information due to high arbitrage costs, Section III showed that 
value stocks are indeed associated w ith stronger and longer post earnings announcements drift 
than glam our stocks by comparing the m onthly alphas in the months following the earnings 
announcements. In Section IV, we follow the procedure o f  M endenhall (2004) to empirically test 
the role o f  idiosyncratic risk in explaining the delayed response to firm-specific information in 
value stocks.
IV. 1 Variables Description
M endenhall (2004) finds a significant positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and 
PEAD by regressing PEAD against idiosyncratic risk and transaction cost variables. We employ 
similar regressions to test the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and PEAD, except we add 
B/M  ratio as an additional variable in explaining the drift. Consistent w ith the findings in Section 
III that value stocks have a stronger and longer PEAD, we expect to see that the B/M  ratio is 
positively associated with the PEAD when the B/M  ratio is the explanatory variable alone. 
However, we expect that the B/M  ratio w ill lose its significance after we control for the arbitrage 
costs in the regression, if  the higher arbitrage cost is the underlying reason for the stronger and 
longer price drift in the value stocks. The motivation and the construction o f the variables are as 
follows:
1. Dependent Variable: Post-earnings announcem ent abnormal returns
We measure post-earnings announcem ent abnormal returns as the compound abnormal return 
from the first month through the third m onth following the earnings announcement. The 
compound return is com puted as the buy and hold return on each stock in the sample minus the 
buy-and-hold return on the CRSP value weighted index:
QEA,q =  f l  (1 +  RET, ^  ) f l 0  +RETm kw ) [2]
l - l  t=1
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where QEAj is stock i ’s compound return from the first month through the third month 
following quarter q ’s earnings announcement. RETi t is the raw return o f  the stock i for month 
t relative to the earnings announcem ent m onth for quarter q . RETmkl t is the CRSP value 
weighted index return for m onth t relative to the earnings announcement m onth for quarter q . 
M onths, designated by t, run from 1 month to 3 months relative to the earnings announcement 
month.
2. Explanatory Variables
A. Earnings surprise
As described in Section II, the earnings surprise metric is the 3-day cumulative abnormal 
return (-1, 0, 1) around the earnings announcement. Using the cumulative abnormal returns 
around the earnings announcem ent day provides a clean and easy way to measure earnings 
surprises since they do not require a model for expected earnings. We simply refer to this variable 
as CAR(-1, +1).
B. B/M  ratio
As described in Section II, the book-to-market is calculated as the ratio o f  the book value o f 
common equity (item #60) to the market value o f  the equity (item #199 x item #25) at the end of 
the fiscal year preceding the quarterly earnings announcement.
C. Idiosyncratic risk
As described in Chapter II, we estimate the idiosyncratic risk relative to the CRSP value- 
weighted index, and the m ean residual error from market model regression is estimated over days 
-255 to -2 relative to the announcement.
D. Transaction cost: Volume
We use dollar volume to measure the transaction cost. To minimize over-specification 
concerns, we do not include price in the regression estimation, since we find a high positive 
correlations between price and B/M  ratio, and a high negative correlation between price and
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idiosyncratic risk. In addition, M endenhall (2004) finds no relationship between price and post 
earnings announcem ent drift. As in M endenhall (2004), VOLUM E is the closing daily stock price 
times daily shares traded averaged over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement.
3. Transformations o f  the variables
To account for possible nonlinearities between the dependent and explanatory variables, 
Bernard and Thomas (1990), Bhushan (1994), Bartov et al. (2000) and M endenhall (2004), use 
rank scores for their earnings surprise variable and the explanatory variables. For the same 
reasons, we transform each explanatory variable (CAR, BM, IDIO, and VOLUM E) into coded 
scores based on their rank w ithin pooled earnings announcem ent observations, and then scale the 
coded scores from 0.0 to 1.0. Em ploying the procedure o f  M endenhall (2004), we then subtract 
0.5 from the coded scores. Therefore our final coded scores for each variable range between -0.5 
to +0.5. Coding independent variables from -0.5 to +0.5 allows the intercept o f  a regression o f 
abnormal returns on a dependent variable to represent the abnormal returns for a hypothetical 
median observation between the two middle deciles o f  the independent variable, w hich should be 
close to zero. The slope coefficient can then be interpreted as the difference in abnormal returns 
between the highest and the lowest deciles o f  the independent variable.
IV.2 Determinants o f  Asymmetric Post-Earnings Announcem ent Drift between Value and 
Glamour Stocks
To address the issue o f  how idiosyncratic risk contributing to the asymmetric post earnings 
announcem ent drift between value and glam our stocks, we modify M endenhall’s (2004) 
regression by adding B/M  ratio as an extra explanatory variable, and expect to see that the 
idiosyncratic risk dominates the B/M  ratio in explaining the post earnings announcem ent drift: 
QE4q =a+bCAlfq +c{CA%q *BMiq) + d (C A ^  * IDIQq)+e{CA%q *VOLUM£q)+ siq [3]
where QEAjq is stock i ’s compound abnormal return from the first month through the third 
month following quarter q ’s earnings announcement. The compound abnormal return is
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computed as the buy and hold compound return on each stock minus the buy-and-hold return on 
the CRSP value weighted index. CARj is the market model cumulative abnormal return for the 
3-day w indow (-1, 0, 1) around the earnings announcem ent for stock i in quarter q . BM  is the 
B/M ratio calculated at the end o f the fiscal year preceding the announcement. IDIOj q is the 
mean residual error from the market model regression estimated over days -255 to -2 relative to 
the announcem ent for stock i in quarter q . V O L U M E is the closing daily stock price times
daily shares traded averaged over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcem ent for stock i 
in quarter q .
As in M endenhall (2004), we investigate the relationship between arbitrage costs and the 
PEAD through assessing whether arbitrage cost variables have an impact on the earnings surprise 
and PEAD relationship. In other words, we use interaction variables, the interaction between 
CAR and the arbitrage cost variables, to test how the relationship between the earnings surprise 
and price drift varies w ith various arbitrage costs o f  the firm observations. As we discussed above, 
coding earnings surprise variable CAR from -0.5 to +0.5 allows interpretation o f  the coefficient 
on CAR as the average difference in abnormal returns between the observations in the highest 
and lowest CAR deciles. Coding other explanatory variables from -0.5 to +0.5 allows the 
interpretation o f  the coefficient on each interaction variable to be the additional spread in 
abnormal returns between high and low CAR stocks, for observations in the highest versus the 
lowest deciles o f  the arbitrage cost variables.
Table 12 reports the estim ation results o f  the regression [3], Panel A reports the estimation 
results using as the dependent variable, QEA, the abnormal return com pounded 3 months 
following the earnings announcement. Com pounding 3 months is the standard practice for 
calculating quarterly abnormal returns. However, it raises the concern that the 3 month compound 
return may be affected by subsequent earnings announcem ents which usually occur in the third 
m onth following the earnings announcement. To eliminate the possibility that the third month
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abnormal return is generated by the subsequent earnings announcement, we also report the 
estimation results when the dependent variable QEA is the abnormal return compounded only 2 
months following the earnings announcement in Panel B.
Panels A and B produce very sim ilar results. We find significant positive coefficients on 
CAR in all regressions, suggesting that, for observations w ith median arbitrage costs, the highest 
CAR decile produces higher post earnings announcem ent abnormal returns than the lowest CAR 
decile. In Panel A, the coefficient o f  CAR o f 1.662 indicates that for observations w ith median 
arbitrage costs, the highest CAR decile produces 3-month abnormal returns 1.662% higher than 
the lowest CAR decile.
The main result in Table 12 is that w ithout controlling for arbitrage cost variables 
(idiosyncratic risk and volume), the B/M  ratio plays a  significant role in determ ining post 
earnings announcem ent drift. The coefficients o f  the interaction variable CAR*BM  are 0.543 
(t=2.37) and 0.483 ( t= l .74) for 3-month and 2-m onth abnormal returns, respectively, indicating 
that the spread between the abnormal returns o f  the highest and lowest earnings surprise deciles is 
0.543% and 0.483% larger for firms in the highest B/M  ratio decile than for firms in lowest B/M  
ratio decile in the second and third m onth following the earnings announcem ent respectively. 
However, when we control for the idiosyncratic risk and dollar volume o f the stock, the B/M  ratio 
no longer plays any role in determining the post earnings announcem ent drift. Instead, we observe 
significant coefficients for both arbitrage cost variables. Specifically, idiosyncratic risk is 
positively correlated w ith the price drift, and volume is negative correlated with the price drift, 
suggesting that high arbitrage costs are associated w ith a stronger and longer drift. The results 
that arbitrage cost variables dom inate the B/M  ratio in explaining the price drift lends support to 
our main hypothesis that higher arbitrage costs borne by value stocks, and not the B/M  ratio per 
se, contribute to the slower price adjustm ent to firm-specific information for value stocks.
In addition, the results show that idiosyncratic risk plays a major role in determ ining the price 
drift. The coefficients o f idiosyncratic risk are larger than those o f  volume in both magnitude and
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significance. The coefficients o f the interaction between IDIO and CAR are 1.348 (t=4.86) and 
1.034 (t=3.08) for 3-month and 2-month abnormal returns, respectively, indicating that the spread 
between the abnormal returns o f  the highest and lowest earnings surprise deciles is 1.348% and 
1.034% larger for firms in the highest idiosyncratic risk decile than for firms in lowest 
idiosyncratic risk decile in the second and third month following the earnings announcement 
respectively. W hereas the coefficients o f  the interaction between VOLUM E and CAR are -0.573 
(t=-2.01) and -0.553 (t=-l .60) for 3-m onth and 2-month abnormal return respectively, only about 
one half o f  the magnitude o f  the coefficients o f  the idiosyncratic risk interaction variable. In fact, 
the volume interaction variable is only significant in determining the 3-month price drift, and its 
t-statistic (t=-2.01) is much smaller than the t-statistic o f  the idiosyncratic risk interaction variable 
for the 3-month abnormal return (t=4.86). These results are consistent with P o n tiffs  argument 
that idiosyncratic risk is the single most im portant impediment to market efficiency.
[Insert Table 12 here]
IV.3 Determinants o f  Asymmetric Post-Earnings Announcem ent Drift between Value and 
Glamour stocks: Extreme Earnings N ew s Analysis
In order to test the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and price drift directly without 
using interactive terms with earnings surprise, M endenhall (2004) focuses his second regression 
tests on a subsample o f observations w ith extreme good or bad earnings surprises. He argues that 
in the extreme news deciles, the earnings surprise and drift relationship is essentially flat, 
therefore there is no need to control for earnings surprise for the extreme news subsample.
We define earnings surprises in the highest (lowest) 10% CAR decile as extreme good (bad) 
news. W ithin these extreme earnings surprise deciles, we find low correlations o f  0.01 and 0.03 
between CAR and the 3-m onth post earnings announcement abnormal returns for good and bad 
news deciles respectively, indicating that the effect o f  CAR on the price drift is negligible for the 
extreme news observations. Therefore, following M endenhall (2004), we pool observations in the
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extreme good and bad news deciles together and estimate the following regression for the 
extreme news subsample:
QEAi q -  a + b(BMi q) + c(IDIOj q) + d{VOLUMEi q) + s iq [4]
We specify QEA as the dependent variable for extreme good news announcements and QEA 
times -1.0 as the dependent variable for extreme bad news announcements. All explanatory 
variables for this regression are coded decile score ranging from -0.5 to 0.5 based on their ranking 
within the extreme earnings announcements observations. Unlike regressions [3], there is no 
interactive specification in the regression [4], each coefficient can be simply interpreted as the 
effect o f  the explanatory variable on the post earnings announcement abnormal returns.
Panels A and B on Table 13 report the estim ation results for the extreme news observations 
when the dependent variable QEA is the abnormal return compounded 3 months and 2 months 
following the earnings announcem ent respectively. Consistent with earlier results, idiosyncratic 
risk dominates the B/M  ratio in determ ining the post earnings announcements drift. The 
coefficients o f  idiosyncratic risk are 0.688 (t=2.96) and 0.521 ( t= l .83) for 3-month abnormal 
returns and 2-months abnormal returns respectively, indicating that for the extreme news 
observations, the highest idiosyncratic risk decile exhibits positive (negative) 3-month abnormal 
returns for good-news (bad-news) observations 0.688% higher (lower) than those in the lowest 
idiosyncratic risk decile, and the spread in the 2-m onth abnormal returns between the highest and 
lowest idiosyncratic risk deciles is 0.521 percentage points. In addition, the coefficients on 
VOLUM E are negative, suggesting a positive correlation between the transaction cost and price 
drift. However, they are not significant. These results provide additional evidence that the 
idiosyncratic risk is the single, most important determinant o f the post earnings announcement 
drift.
[Insert Table 13 here]
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IV.4 Asymmetric Drift - Idiosyncratic Risk Relationship between Value and Glamour stocks
The above regression test for the entire sample provides evidence that the post earnings 
announcement drift increases in idiosyncratic risk. We then run the following regression for 
value and glamour stocks separately to test explicitly how idiosyncratic risk contributes to the 
asymmetric price adjustm ent to the earnings announcement between value and glamour stocks. 
Specifically, we are interested in investigating how the relationship between idiosyncratic risk 
and price drift differs between value stocks and glamour stocks.
QEA, q = a  + bCARi q + c(CARiq * IDIO.q) +  d(CAR, q * VOLUME, q) +  ^  [5]
The construction o f  the variables has been discussed under Equation [3], The B/M portfolios are 
sorted based on the B/M  ratio calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the earnings 
announcement for the pooled earnings announcem ent observations. We define the lowest 20% 
B/M  quintile as the glamour portfolio and the highest 20% B/M quintile as the value portfolio. 
All three independent variables have been converted to coded scores ranging from -0.5 to 0.5 
based on their ranking w ithin the value and glamour portfolios separately.
To be consistent w ith our hypothesis that value stocks are exposed to high arbitrage costs that 
impede arbitrageurs from establishing positions in elim inating mispricing, resulting in stronger 
and longer price drift following earnings announcements, we expect to see a higher loading o f 
arbitrage cost in value stocks than in glamour stocks.
Table 14 presents the regression results for value and glamour stocks separately. The 
significant positive relationship between earnings announcement drift and idiosyncratic risk is 
observed in value stocks only. The coefficients o f  the interaction variable CAR*IDIO are 1.310 
(t=2.04) and 0.646 (t=0.95) for value and glamour stocks respectively, indicating that the spread 
between the abnormal returns o f  the highest and lowest earnings surprise deciles is 1.310% larger 
for firms in the highest idiosyncratic risk decile than for firms in lowest idiosyncratic risk decile 
for value stocks. However a similar pattern is not seen for glamour stocks. The asymmetric
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sensitivities o f  price drift to idiosyncratic risk between value and glamour stocks suggests that 
idiosyncratic risk is more heavily loaded in value stocks than in glamour stocks, therefore the 
positive association between idiosyncratic risk and price drift is more pronounced for value 
stocks than for glamour stocks. These results provide evidence in support o f  our main hypothesis 
that the asymmetric idiosyncratic risk loading contributes to the asymmetric price adjustm ent to 
firm-specific information between value and glamour stocks. Specifically, the high idiosyncratic 
risk in value stocks is attributable to their slower reaction to earnings announcements.
[Insert Table 14 here]
III. Conclusion
Chapter III explores the asymmetric price adjustm ent to firm-specific information between 
value and glamour stocks. Consistent w ith the docum entation in Chapter I that glamour stocks 
react to new inform ation faster than value stocks, we find that value stocks generate stronger and 
longer post-earnings announcem ent drift than do glamour stocks. W e propose and test the 
hypothesis that the higher arbitrage risk borne by the value stocks relative to glamour stocks 
delays the diffusion o f  firm inform ation into value stock prices. We find confirming evidence that 
price drift increases in arbitrage costs. Specifically, idiosyncratic volatility exhibits a consistent 
positive effect on the abnormal returns. However, the transaction cost variables produce some 
mixed results. This finding lends support to the argument that idiosyncratic risk is the single 
largest deterrent to market efficiency, and thus a major determ inant o f  the asymmetric price drift 
between value and glam our stocks.
Conclusion
M otivated by the findings o f  Lo and M acKinlay (1990) that size premium can be partially 
attributed to the lead-lag relation between the returns o f  large stocks and those o f  small stocks, in
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this thesis we hypothesize that a possible lead-lag structure between value and glam our returns 
can partially explain the value premium anomaly.
The first chapter finds that glamour stocks lead value stocks in terms o f both m ean returns 
and volatility spillover, indicating that glamour stocks react to new information faster than do 
value stocks. To investigate the issue further, we test the asymmetric price reaction to market- 
and firm-specific information between value and glamour stocks separately. W e find confirming 
evidence that value stocks lag in absorbing both market- and firm-specific information relative to 
glamour stocks.
But why is information diffusion slower in value stocks than in glam our stocks? M otivated 
by the costly arbitrage literature, which posits that arbitrage cost is the major deterrent to market 
efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Pontiff 1996, 2005, and M endenhall 2004), we propose and 
empirically test the hypothesis that the high arbitrage cost borne by the value stocks is the culprit 
that delays the information flow into the value stocks. Consistent with the costly arbitrage 
literature, our results show that value stocks are exposed to higher arbitrage costs than are 
glamour stocks. Specifically, we find that value stocks are associated w ith a high idiosyncratic 
risk that impedes a prom pt price reaction to new information. That is, value stocks are exposed to 
a higher unhedgeable risk that forces arbitrageurs to refrain from establishing positions in value 
stocks. This pattern is not reflected in glamour stocks.
Not only do we find that arbitrage risk impedes information diffusion, causing delayed price 
adjustment on part o f  the value stocks, we provide evidence that the idiosyncratic risk is a priced 
risk factor that demands risk premium, and value premium can be explained as com pensation for 
bearing high arbitrage risk.
To sum up, this thesis documents a lead-lag relationship between returns o f value stocks and 
those o f  glamour stocks, and provides empirical evidence that arbitrage cost, and in particular, 
idiosyncratic risk, can partially explain the lead-lag price adjustment to new inform ation between 
value and glamour stocks.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of size-B/M ratio portfolio weekly returns: July, 1963 - May, 2005
Table lreports the summary statistics o f  size-B/M ratio portfolio weekly returns over the July, 1963 to May, 2005 period. The sample includes 
2188 weekly observations for each portfolio. The weekly returns are calculated as average daily returns during the week, and all the daily 
portfolio return data from July 1, 1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s website. Portfolios are constructed in a two-by- 
three sort on size and B/M. Within each o f  the two size quartiles, the stocks are further allocated into three book-to-market portfolios. The size 
breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the end o f June o f year t. B/M for June o f year t is the book equity for the last fiscal 
year ending in t-1 divided by the market equity for December o f  t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. LOW, 
MED, and HIGH refer to the low 30%, medium 40% and high 30% B/M portfolio in each size group.
_____________________________________Autocorrelations (AC)____________________________________
B M  Standard lagl lag2 lag3 lag4 lag5
size Portfolio Mean deviation AC1 Q-Stat AC2 Q-Stat AC3 Q-Stat AC4 Q-Stat AC5 Q-Stat
LOW 0.1897 2.7284 0.197 85.308 0.087 101.970 0.087 118.500 0.033 120.950 0.019 121.730
Small MED 0.2920 2.0224 0.231 117.600 0.101 140.040 0.082 154.810 0.049 160.130 0.028 161.860
HIGH 0.3307 1.9883 0.242 129.300 0.133 168.100 0.097 188.630 0.045 193.060 0.028 194.830
LOW 0.2060 2.2907 -0.010 0.207 0.012 0.511 0.038 3.756 -0.043 7.862 -0.010 8.083
Big MED 0.2258 1.9426 0.014 0.456 0.024 1.776 0.021 2.739 -0.027 4.391 -0.041 8.169
HIGH 0.2654 1.9648 0.052 5.931 0.056 12.897 0.018 13.631 -0.024 14.906 -0.044 19.096
LOW 0.2010 2.2869 0.008 0.133 0.015 0.625 0.044 4.819 -0.039 8.104 -0.008 8.252
All MED 0.2261 1.9283 0.032 2.270 0.028 4.026 0.021 5.017 -0.022 6.088 -0.029 7.902
HIGH 0.2889 1.9293 0.088 16.849 0.069 27.355 0.031 29.405 -0.013 29.767 -0.026 31.235
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Table 2
Cross-autocorrelation in weekly returns of size-B/M ratio portfolios: July, 1963 - May, 2005
The table presents the cross-autocorrelation of weekly returns o f size-B/M portfolios. The weekly returns are calculated as average daily returns during the week, 
and all the daily portfolio return data from July 1, 1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s website. Portfolios are constructed by a two-by- 
three sort on size and B/M. Within each o f  the two size quartiles, the stocks are further allocated to three book-to-market portfolios. The size breakpoint for year t 
is the median NYSE market equity at the end o f  June o f  year t. B/M for June o f  year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year ending in t-1 divided by the 
market equity for December o f  t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. R(g, t) and R(v, t) refer to the weekly returns o f  the low 30% 
B/M (glamour) portfolio and the high 30% B/M (value) portfolio at week t. R(g, t-i) and R(v, t-i) refer to the weekly return o f the low 30% B/M (glamour) 
portfolio and the high 30% B/M (value) portfolio at week (t-i) (i=l,2,3,4). * for 5% level. ** for 1% level.
Cross-autocorrelation in weekly returns by B/M ratio
Small Big All
R(g, t) R(v, t) R (g,t) R(v, t) R (g,t) R(v, t)
R(g, t) 1.0000 0.9032 .. R(g,t) 1.0000 0.8020 .. R(g, t) 1.0000 0.8133 «
R(v,t) 0.9032 .. 1.0000 R(v,t) 0.8020 . 1.0000 R(v, t) 0.8133 .. 1.0000
R(g> t-1) 0.1970 .. 0.2179 .. R(g» t-l) -0.0097 0.0282 R(g,t-1) 0.00779 0.0608 ..
R(v, t-1) 0.1687 .. 0.2425 •• R(v, t-1) -0.0273 0.0519 . R(v, t-1) -0.0132 0.0877 ..
R(g,t-2) 0.0870 .. 0.1168 .. R(g,t-2) 0.0118 0.0372 R(g,t-2) 0.0150 0.0461 •
R(v, t-2) 0.0702 .. 0.1329 .. R(v, t-2) -0.0024 0.0563 .. R(v, t-2) 0.0052 0.0692 ..
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Table 3
The cross-correlation between the lowest and highest B/M portfolio weekly returns: July, 1963 - May, 2005
Table 3 reports the cross-correlations between the lowest and highest B/M portfolio weekly returns estimated from 
the regression below:
= a  P o R g , t  P - l ^ g J - l  P - 2 ^ g , t - 2  P - 3 ^ g , t - 3  £  1
and
Rg,t = a  P o ^v , I  + P - l R y J - l  “1“ P -2^-v,t-2 + P -3^v,l-3 S I J2]
R(g, t) and R(v,t) are the contemporaneous returns o f  the lowest (glamour) and highest (value) B/M portfolios. R(g, 
t-i) and R(v, t-i) are the excess returns i weeks earlier on the glamour and value portfolios (i = 1 ,2 , 3). The weekly 
returns are calculated as average daily returns during the week, and all the daily portfolio return data from July 1, 
1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s website. The portfolios are constructed by a two-by- 
three sort on size and B/M. Within each o f  the two size quartiles, the stocks are further allocated to three book-to- 
market portfolios. The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the end o f  June o f  year t. 
B/M for June o f year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year ending in t-1 divided by market equity for 
December o f  t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. * for 5% level. ** for 1% level.
Small__________   Big____________ All
Eq. [1] Eq. T21 Eq. [1] Eq. \2\ Eq. [1] Eq. f21
a 0.1985 .. -0.1886 .. 0.1156 .. -0.0165 0.1384 .. -0.0420
P(0) 0.6511 .. 1.2618 .. 0.6883 .. 0.9417 .. 0.6854 .. 0.9759 ..
P(-1) 0.0260 .. -0.0606 .. 0.0312 .. -0.0795 .. 0.0458 .. -0.0975 ..
P(-2) 0.0234 .. -0.0559 .. 0.0240 . -0.0530 .. 0.0284 .. -0.0542 ..
P("3) -0.0006 -0.0030 -0.0123 0.0273 -0.0065 0.0153
R2 0.8184 0.8200 0.6454 0.6504 0.6655 0.6706
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Table 4
Weekly estimates of GARCH(1,1)-M models for lowest and highest B/M portfolios:
July, 1963 - May, 2005
Table 4 reports the weekly estimates o f GARCH(1,1)-M model for glamour and value portfolios: 
= a  + PoRg,t + P-i Rg,t-i + y**,, + £ v , t  
hv = a  + b s 2vl_x+ ch vl_l [3]
and
Rgl = a  + P0RVI + P.iRVJ_y + yv g<t + s gJ
h g,,= a + b s l,t-x + chg,,-i [4]
R(v, t) and R(g,t) are the contemporaneous returns o f  the value and glamour portfolios. R(v, t-1) and R(g, t-1) are the 
excess returns 1 week earlier on the value and glamour portfolios, a is the standard deviation o f  the conditional 
variance o f the error term. The weekly returns are calculated as average daily returns during the week, and all the 
daily portfolio return data from July 1, 1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s website. The 
portfolios are constructed by a two-by-three sort on size and B/M. Within each o f the two size quartiles, the stocks 
are further allocated to three book-to-market portfolios. The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market 
equity at the end o f June o f  year t. B/M for June o f  year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year ending in t-1 
divided by market equity for December o f t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. * for 
5% level. ** for 1% level.
Small Big All
Eq. [3] Eq. [4] Eq. [3] Eq. [4] Eq. [3] Eq. [4]
a 0.0311 0.0048 -0.1923 0.0730 -0.1240 0.0823
P(0) 0.6716 .. 1.2104 .. 0.7211 .. 0.8814 .. 0.7115 *4 0.8997
P(-1) 0.0356 .. -0.0626 .. 0.0274 .. -0.0616 .. 0.0478 .. -0.0777
1 0.1964 . -0.1585 0.2860 .. -0.0584 0.2445 * -0.0870
a 0.0303 .. 0.0498 .. 0.0222 .. 0.0389 .. 0.0606 ** 0.0409
b 0.1043 .. 0.1171 .. 0.0551 .. 0.1046 .. 0.0907 .. 0.1071
c 0.8549 .. 0.8457 .. 0.9283 .. 0.8753 .. 0.8651 ** 0.8741
log
likelihood -2592.7868 -3208.25 -3323.75 -3551.03 -3255.41 -3511.38
R2 0.82 0.82 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67
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Table 5
The volatility spillover between the lowest and highest B/M portfolio weekly returns: July, 1963 - May, 2005
Table 5 reports the volatility spillover between the lowest and highest B/M portfolio weekly returns using GARCH-M model:
R vt =  a  +  R gt +  +  y<rvt +  s VJ
hv = a + bev2,_, + chvt_x + de\ ,„x
\P\
and
R g, t  = a +  P o R v,t + f l - i R v , t - \  +  y a  g ,t + £ g ,t
h g, t= a  + + c h g j -1 + d s l j - i  [6 ]
R(v, t) and R(g,t) are the contemporaneous returns o f  the value and glamour portfolios. R(v, t-1) and R(g, t-1) are the excess 
return 1 week earlier on the value and glamour portfolios, a is the standard deviation o f  the conditional variance o f the error 
term, d measures the impact o f  past volatility surprises o f  the glamour portfolio on the conditional variance o f value portfolio 
in Eq.[5], and in Eq.[6], d measures the impact o f past volatility surprises o f  the value portfolio on the conditional variance o f  
glamour portfolio. The volatility surprises, e2(g, t-1) and s2(v, t-1) are lagged squared residuals derived from Eq. [4] and [3] 
respectively. The weekly returns are calculated as average daily returns during the week, and all the daily portfolio return data 
from July 1, 1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s website. Portfolios are constructed by a two-by-three 
sort on size and B/M. Within each o f the two size quartiles, the stocks are further allocated to three book-to-market portfolios. 
The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the end o f  June o f  year t. B/M for June o f year t is the book 
equity for the last fiscal year ending in t-1 divided by the market equity for December o f t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th 
and 70th NYSE percentiles. * for 5% level. ** for 1% level.
Small____________   Big_____________   Al[
Eq. \5] Eq. \6] Eq. r51 Eq. m Eq. [5] Eq. T61
a 0.0110 0.0048 -0.1482 0.0730 -0.1148 0.0823
P(0) 0.6716 .. 1.2104 ** 0.7207 .. 0.8814 .. 0.7108 .. 0.8997 ..
p(-l) 0.0357 .. -0.0626 .. 0.0269 .. -0.0616 •• 0.0473 .. -0.0777 ..
y 0.2228 • -0.1585 0.2412 . -0.0584 0.2337 • -0.0870
a 0.0313 .. 0.0498 .* 0.0280 .. 0.0389 .. 0.0615 .. 0.0409 ..
b 0.0847 .. 0.1171 .. 0.0482 .. 0.1046 •• 0.0665 .. 0.1071 ..
c 0.8472 .. 0.8457 « 0.9122 .. 0.8753 .. 0.8583 .. 0.8741 ..
d 0.0141 .. 1.0000E-06 0.0141 .. 8.8090E-20 0.0216 - 6.3790E-21
log
likelihood -2589.89 -3208.25 -3318.17 -3551.03 -3248.85 -3511.38
R2 0.82 0.82 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67
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Table 6
Regressions of zero net investment on value-weighted market returns: July, 1963 - May, 2005
This table reports the results from regressing the difference between the weekly returns on glamour and value portfolios 
within each size group, on value-weighted market returns:
k
R g , t  ~  R v, t  = ( X  +  P o R m , t + ' ^ J P - k R m , t - k + £ t
k = 1
h t — ci + b s  f _ j + ch t _ j mi
R(g, t) and R(v, t) are the contemporaneous excess returns o f  the lowest (glamour) and highest B/M (value) portfolios. P(0) is 
the current beta and £  P(-l, -k) refers to the sum o f lagged betas. The regressions are fitted with 3 and 5 lags (k=3 and k=5). 
The weekly returns are calculated as average daily returns during the week, and all the daily portfolio return data from July 1, 
1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s website. Portfolios are constructed by a two-by-three sort on size 
and B/M. Within each o f  the two size quartiles, the stocks are further allocated to three book-to-market portfolios. The size 
breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the end o f June o f year t. B/M for June o f year t is the book equity 
for the last fiscal year ending in t-1 divided by market equity for December o f  t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th 
NYSE percentiles. * for 5% level. ** for 1% level.
Small
A. 3 lags 
Big_______ All Small
B. 5 lags 
Big All
a
W0)
W-1)
K-2)
K-3)
p(-4)
P(-5)
-0.1451
0.3025
0.0173
-0.0261
0.0059
-0.0601
0.1925
-0.0571
-0.0282
0.0103
-0.0792
0.2157
-0.0763
-0.0403
-0.0046
-0.1447
0.3026
0.0171
-0.0263
0.0058
0.0076
-0.0059
-0.0614
0.1927
-0.0562
-0.0282
0.0097
-0.0093
0.0189
-0.0769
0.2147
-0.0754
-0.0396
-0.0043
-0.0197
0.0029
-0.0029 -0.0750 - 0.1212 -0.0017 -0.0651 -0.1361
0.0532
0.1411
0.8112
0.0335
0.0681
0.9109
0.0603
0.0905
0.8722
0.0542
0.1432
0.8081
0.0328
0.0678
0.9117
0.0586
0.0889
0.8749
log
likelihood -2978.96 -3494.77 -3419.40 -2976.09 -3491.18 -3416.06
R2 0.33 0.14 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.17
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T able 7
Regressions of B/M portfolio weekly returns on value-weighted market returns: July, 1963 - May, 2005
This table reports the results from regressing the weekly returns of glamour and value portfolios within each size group, on 
value-weighted market returns:
R v, t  -  a  +  f i o R m , t + ^ J P - k R m , l - k  +  y ( T  t +  S  t 
2 k = lht= a + b£t_i+cht_{ [2]
and
k
R g J — ° C + P o R m J + ' ^ J  P - k R m , t - k  +  Y ° ' t  +  £ t
k=  1
ht= a + bsf_x + cht_x [3]
R(g, t) and R(v, t) are the contemporaneous excess returns o f the lowest (glamour) and highest B/M (value) portfolios, a is the 
standard deviation o f the conditional variance o f  the error term. p(0) is the current beta and £  P(-1, -k) refers to the sum o f  
lagged betas. The regressions are fitted with 5 lags (k=5). The weekly returns are calculated as average daily returns during 
the week, and all the daily portfolio return data from July 1, 1963 to May 31, 2005 are from Professor Kenneth French’s 
website. Portfolios are constructed in a two-by-three sort on size and B/M. Within each o f  the two size quartiles, the stocks are 
further allocated to three book-to-market portfolios. The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the 
end o f June o f year t. B/M for June o f year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year ending in t-1 divided by market equity 
for December o f  t-1. The B/M breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. * for 5% level. ** for 1% level.
Small Big All
Eq. T21___________ E qJ3]__________ E aJ2]___________EqJ3]___________Eq. f21
a -0.1796 * 0.0399 0.0279 -0.0270 0.0446 -0.0386
P(0) 0.7860 ** 1.1382 0.8861 ** 1.0769 .. 0.8704 .. 1.0797 ..
P(-D 0.1800 ** 0.2109 .* -0.0010 -0.0541 .. 0.0436 .. -0.0376 ..
P(-2) 0.0477 ** 0.0311 0.0109 -0.0134 0.0242 .. -0.0103 .
P(-3) 0.0333 ** 0.0352 ** -0.0249 ** -0.0092 -0.0008 -0.0041
P("4) 0.0394 ** 0.0425 -0.0006 -0.0119 . 0.0168 • -0.0068
P(-5)
k
0.0324 ** 0.0199 -0.0167 * -0.0012 0.0079 0.0014
I  P - k
*=i 0.3328 ** 0.3396 .. -0.0323 * -0.0898 ** 0.0917 .. -0.0573 ..
Y 0.3889 ** -0.0046 0.1854 ** 0.2362 0.1779 . 0.2651
a 0.052 ** 0.0443 0.0144 • * 0.0531 ** 0.0295 .. 0.0599 **
b 0.1171 «* 0.0698 •* 0.0736 ** 0.1206 0.1143 .. 0.1453 . .
c 0.8382 ** 0.9021 0.9091 ** 0.7042 ** 0.8601 . . 0.6231 ..
log likelihood -3022.09 -3465.5 -2725.6 -1712.5 -2699.7 -1521.8
R2 73.36% 78.61% 75.58% 94.43% 77.58% 95.28%
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Table 8
Summary statistics of arbitrage cost variables: 1987 - 2005
Table 8 reports summary statistics o f arbitrage cost variables for both exchange-traded and NASDAQ stocks. All 
values are calendar year based data. Panel A reports full sample summary statistics. Panels B and C report 
summary statistics for value and glamour stocks respectively. Value, medium and glamour portfolios are three 
equal sized book-to-market portfolios formed at the beginning o f  each calendar year from 1987 to 2005. Value 
portfolio is consist o f highest 33% B/M ratio stocks, medium portfolio is consist o f  medium 33% B/M ratio 
stocks, and glamour portfolio is consist o f  lowest 33% B/M ratio stocks. B/M is the ratio o f book value o f  
common equity to market value o f  the equity at the end o f  prior calendar year. IDIO MKT is the residual 
standard error from a market model regression o f  the stocks' daily excess returns on those o f  the CRSP value- 
weighted index over a year. IDIO FF is the residual standard error from a FF-three factor model regression o f the 
stocks' daily returns over a year. PRICE is the closing daily stock price averaged over all trading days during a 
year. VOLUME is the closing daily stock price times daily shares traded averaged over all trading days during a 
year (in millions o f  dollars).
Panel A. Full Sample
B/M IDIO MKT IDIO FF PRICE VOLUME
Mean 0.870 0.0412 0.0408 17.444 9.412
Std. Dev 24.715 0.0324 0.0323 21.724 58.333
N 66568 66552 66534 66568 66568
Panel B. Value Stocks
Mean 1.861 0.047 0.047 11.093 2.128
Std. Dev 42.792 0.039 0.039 17.460 12.689
N 22188.000 22184 22178 22188 22188
Panel C. Glamour Stocks
Mean 0.220 0.041 0.040 22.545 19.899
Std. Dev 0.108 0.030 0.030 27.233 96.561
N 22184.000 22177 22170 22184 22184
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Table 9
C om parison  o f arb itrage cost of d iffe ren t B /M  portfo lios: 1987-2005
Table 9 reports arbitrage costs statistics o f  three book-to-m arket portfolios. The value, medium  and glam our portfolios are three equal sized book-to-m arket portfolios formed at the beginning o f  each calendar year from  1987 to 2005. The value 
portfolio consists o f  highest 33% B /M  ratio stocks, the medium portfolio consists o f  medium 33% B /M  ratio stocks, and the glam our portfolio consists o f  lowest 33%  B /M  ratio stocks. All values are calendar year based data. B /M  is the ratio 
o f  book value o f  common equity to  m arket value o f  the equity at the prior calendar year end. PRICE is the closing daily stock price averaged over all trading days during a year. VOLUME is the closing daily  stock price tim es daily shares 
traded averaged over all trading days during a year (in m illions o f dollars). EDIO_MKT is the residual standard error from a  m arket model regression o f  the stocks' daily excess returns on those o f  the C RSP value-w eighted index over a year. 
IDIO_FF is the residual standard error from  a FF-three factor model regression o f  the stocks' daily returns over a  year. * for 5% lev e l, * * for 1 %  level.
A. IDIO M KT
19*7 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All
Years
value 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.050 0.054 0.055 0.050 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.053 0.055 0.057 0.064 0.053 0.046 0.031 0.028 0,047
medium 0.033 0.030 0.027 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.040 0.042 0.048 0.045 0.039 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.035
glamour 0.037 0.032 0.029 0.035 0.034 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.042 0.042 0.047 0.048 0.062 0.050 0.044 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.041
diff. (V-G) 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.020 0015 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.001 0 000 0.006 0.007 -0.005 0.014 0.009 0.014 -0.001 -0.002 0.006
aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa * A* aa AA AA AA
B IDIO FF
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All
Years
value 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.050 0.054 0.055 0.050 0.045 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.052 0.055 0.056 0.063 0.053 0.046 0.031 0.028 0.047
medium 0.032 0.030 0.027 0.032 0.033 0.035 0,034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.039 0.042 0.048 0.044 0.039 0.030 0.025 0.025 0.035
glamour 0.035 0.032 0.029 0.035 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.047 0.060 0.049 0.043 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.040
diff. (V-G) 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.007 -0.004 0.014 0.010 0.014 -0.001 -0.002 0.007
** aa a* aa * a a * a* AA A A A AA A* A* A* AA
(:. PRICE
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All
Years
value 14.942 12.114 12.098 9.565 9.257 8.935 11.088 11.493 11.722 12.186 13.185 11.684 8.808 9.375 6.865 7.780 7.974 15.213 18.072 11.093
medium 21.201 16.009 18.894 17.640 17.794 18.936 19.581 18.523 18.463 19.531 20.838 18.734 17.276 18.310 16.579 16.578 16.652 21.800 21.999 18.694
glamour 22.737 19.168 21.573 21.463 24.898 20.125 19.571 18.214 20.456 22.184 21.908 22.943 26.338 31.759 22.352 19.957 22.390 22.300 23.355 22.545
diff. (V-G) -7.79 -7.05 -9.48 -11.90 -15.64 -11.19 -8.48 -6.72 -8.73 -10.00 -8.72 -11.26 -17.53 -22.38 -15.49 -12.18 -14.42 -7.09 -5.28 -11.45
. . aa aa aa a* ** a * ** ** ** aa * a * a A* * * A* AA AA AA A*
D. VOLUME
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
All
Years
value 1.600 0.929 0.877 0.628 0.675 0.563 0.924 0.760 0.975 1.011 1.409 1.537 1.059 1.357 1.603 1.857 2.981 6.813 10.408 2.128
medium 2.828 1.433 2.077 1.815 1.796 2.443 2.669 2.894 3.666 4.124 5.129 4.880 4.939 7.760 7.390 8.355 9.177 15.735 19.160 6.234
glamour 3.463 2.556 3.154 3.639 4.891 4.055 5.224 5.191 7.684 9.966 12.920 16.772 30.925 55.173 37.802 30.915 29.309 30.430 34.312 19.899
diff. (V-G) -1.86 -1.63 -2.28 -3.01 -4.22 -3.49 -4.30 -4.43 -6.71 -8.95 -11.51 -15.23 -29.87 -53.82 -36.20 -29.06 -26.33 -23.62 -23.90 -17.77
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Table 10
Portfolio Post-Earnings Announcement Returns by B/M Ratio: 1st Quarter of 1994 - 3rd Quarter of 2005
Table 10 reports the average monthly portfolio returns at month (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3) following earnings 
announcement sorted by the nature o f  news and B/M  ratio. Starting from the first quarter o f 1994, at each 
quarterly earnings announcement we classify earnings surprises into three equal sized news groups based on the 
cumulative abnormal return in the 3-day window (-1, 0, 1), and we define the group with the lowest 33% CAR as 
the Bad news group and the group with the highest 33% CAR as the Good news group. Within both the Good and 
Bad earnings surprise, stocks are further sorted into five equal sized B/M quintiles based on the B/M ratio 
calculated at the end o f the fiscal year preceding the quarterly earnings announcement. Portfolio returns are 
equally weighted. The t-statistics are in parentheses and above 10% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
Post Earnings Announcement Portfolio Monthly Returns
Sorted by
Month t+1 
Earnings news
Month t+2 
Earnings news
Month t+3 
Earnings news
B/M ratio Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good
Q1 (glamour) 0.0027 0.0096 0.0067 0.0107 0.0052 0.0113
Q5 (value) 0.0062 0.0246 0.0181 0.0260 0.0176 0.0291
Q5-Q1 0.0035 0.0150 0.0114 0.0153 0.0124 0.0178
(0.87) (4.70) (3.57) (5.31) (3.77) (5.48)
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Table 11
Post-Earnings Announcement Monthly Alphas by B/M Ratio: 1st Quarter of 1994 - 3rd Quarter of 2005
Table 11 reports the monthly alphas of value and glamour portfolios for each o f  the three months following the earnings news. 
Starting from the first quarter o f  1994, for each quarterly earnings announcement we classify earnings surprises into three 
equal sized news groups based on the cumulative abnormal return in the 3-day window (-1, 0, 1), and we define the group 
with the lowest 33% CAR as the Bad news group and the group with the highest 33% CAR as the Good news group. Within 
both the Good and Bad earnings groups, stocks are further sorted into five equal sized B/M quintiles based on the B/M  ratio 
calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the quarterly earnings announcement. D1 and D5 refer to the lowest 
(glamour) and the highest B/M  (value) portfolios respectively. Portfolio returns are equally weighted. Monthly alphas are 
computed relative to the following Fama-French three factor model:
Rjt —d  + P R mt +SSMB t +  cj)HML t + s jt
where R(it) is the monthly return o f the highest (value) and the lowest B/M (glamour) portfolios in excess o f  one-month 
treasury bill rate. R(mt) is the value-weighted market return in excess o f  one-month treasury bill rate. The SMB and HML are 
size premium and value premium factors. Alphas represent the abnormal returns. The t-statistics are in parentheses and above 
5% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
Post Earnings Announcement Portfolio Monthly Alphas
Month t+1 Month t+2 Month t+3
Sorted by Earnings news Earnings news Earnings news
B/M ratio Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good
Q1 (glamour) -0.2789 0.1197 0.0231 0.5025 0.1329 0.3909
(-1.16) (0.48) (0.10) (2.40) (0.58) (1.66)
Q5 (value) -0.7945 0.8527 1.4567 1.7069 1.6064 2.8412
(-3.91) (3.91) (6.93) (8.87) (6.63) (13.18)
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright owner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
57
Table 12
Determinants of Asymmetric Post-Earnings Announcement Drift between Value and Glamour stocks : 1st Quarter of 1994 - 3rd Quarter of 2005
Table 12 reports the estimation results o f  the following regression. Panels A and B report the estimation results when the dependent variable QEA is the abnormal 
return compounded 3 months and 2 m onths following earnings announcements respectively.
QEAiq = a  + bCARiq + c(CARiq * B M ig) + d{CARi q * IDIO iq) + e{CARiq * VOLUME iq) + s iq [3]
QEA is the compound abnormal return from the first month through the third m onth following the earnings announcement. The compound abnormal return is computed 
as the buy and hold return on each stock m inus the buy and hold return on the CRSP value weighted index. CAR is the m arket model cumulative abnormal return for 
the 3-day window (-1, +1) around the earnings announcements. BM  is B/M  ratio calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the announcement. IDIO is the m ean 
residual error from market model regression estim ated over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement. VOLUM E is the closing daily stock price tim es daily 
shares traded averaged over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement. ALL independent variables have been converted to coded scores ranging from -0.5 
to 0.5 based on their ranking within pooled earnings announcement observations. A ll coefficients have been m ultiplied by 10. Above 10% statistical significance is 
indicated in bold.
Panel A: 3 m onths compounding
Variables Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept -0.563 -23.24 -0.556 -22.92
CAR 1.662 21.88 1.513 18.82
CAR*BM 0.543 2.37 0.246 0.96
CAR*IDIO 1.348 4.86
C AR* V OLUME -0.573 -2.01
Adj-R2_________________________________ 28.00% ______________________________________________________ 0.30%
Variables
Panel B: 2 months compounding
Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept -0.304 -10.33 -0.298 -10.12
CAR 1.68 18.23 1.564 16.07
CAR*BM 0.483 1.74 0.209 0.67
CAR*IDIO 1.034 3.08
C AR* V OLUM E -0.553 -1.60
Adj-R2 0.19% 0.20%
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Table 13
Determinants of Asymmetric Post-Earnings Announcement Drift between Value and Glamour stocks: Extreme Earnings News Analysis
Table 13 reports the estimation results o f the following regression for the extreme news observations. Panels A and B report the estimation results when 
the dependent variable QEA is the abnormal return compounded 3 months and 2 months following earnings announcements respectively.
Q E A t q -  a + b (B M  Kq) + c( lD10  Kq) + d{VOLUME  M
Earnings surprises in the highest (lowest) 10% CAR decile is defined as extreme good (bad) news. CAR is the market model cumulative abnormal 
return for the 3-day window (-1, +1) around the earnings announcements. QEA is the compound abnormal return from the first month through the third 
month following the earnings announcement. The compound abnormal return is computed as the buy and hold return on each stock minus the buy and 
hold return on the CRSP value weighted index. QEA is the dependent variable for extreme good news announcements and QEA times -1.0 is the 
dependent variable for extreme bad news announcements. BM is B/M ratio calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding the announcement. IDIO is 
the mean residual error from market model regression estimated over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement. VOLUME is the closing 
daily stock price times daily shares traded averaged over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement. ALL independent variables have been 
converted to coded scores ranging from -0.5 to 0.5 based on their ranking within extreme earnings news observations. All coefficients have been 
multiplied by 10. Above 10% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
 Panel A: 3 months compounding Panel B: 2 months compounding____________
Variables Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept 1.085 15.86 1.098 13.11
BM 0.002 0.09 0.206 0.69
IDIO 0.688 2.96 0.521 1.83
VOLUME -0.393 -1.51 -0.309 -0.97
Adj-R2 0.04% 0.02%
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Table 14
Asymmetric Drift - Idiosyncratic Risk Relationship between Value and Glamour stocks: 1st Quarter o f 1994 -  3rd Quarter of 2005
Table 14 reports the estimation results o f  the following regression. Panels A and B report the estimation results for stocks in the value and 
glamour portfolios separately.
QEAiq = a + bCARiq + c(CARjq *IDIOjq) + d(CARjq * VOLUMEj q) + s iq [5]
B/M portfolios are sorted based on the B/M ratio calculated at the end o f  the fiscal year preceding earnings announcement for the pooled 
earnings announcement observations. We define the lowest 20% B/M quintile as glamour portfolio and the highest 20% B/M quintile as 
value portfolio. QEA is the compound abnormal return from the first month through the third month following the earnings announcement. 
The compound abnormal return is computed as the buy and hold return on each stock minus the buy and hold return on the CRSP value 
weighted index. CAR is the market model cumulative abnormal return for the 3-day window (-1, +1) around the earnings announcements. 
IDIO is the mean residual error from market model regression estimated over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement. 
VOLUME is the closing daily stock price times daily shares traded averaged over trading days -255 to -2 relative to the announcement. All 
three independent variables have been converted to coded scores ranging from -0.5 to 0.5 based on their ranking within the value and 
glamour portfolios separately. All coefficients have been multiplied by 10. Above 10% statistical significance is indicated in bold.
Panel A: value stocks Panel B: glamour stocks
Variables Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept 0.410 7.05 -1.519 -24.59
CAR 2.178 11.40 1.622 8.08
CAR* IDIO 1.310 2.04 0.646 0.95
C AR* V OLUME 0.173 0.29 -0.400 -0.62
Adj-R2 0.46% 0.22%
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